The Department of Defense requests an appropriation of $141.7 billion to fund ongoing military operations in the Global War on Terror during Fiscal Year 2008. This request represents the best estimate of funding requirements at this time.

The following volume is a summary justification for this request to provide a clear explanation of the need for these funds and their uses. The military departments are providing the Congress with detailed information on this request in additional volumes.

This justification explains what America’s warfighters need to continue the fight next year – in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in other locations around the globe. Included are amounts needed for troop subsistence; special pays; supplies; fuel; ammunition; and transportation for troops, tanks, vehicles, helicopters, and other equipment.

Also included in this request are funds for training and equipping Iraq and Afghan military and police units, which bear the principal responsibility for security in those countries.

The following pages also include a summary of the minimum near-term costs associated with reconstituting the force. This involves repairing or replacing the hundreds of thousands of pieces of military equipment that have been destroyed, damaged, or worn out during military operations.

Finally, it should be understood that this request is based upon the Department’s best estimate of funding needs at this time (February 2007). If circumstances in the theater change, the Department may seek to amend this request as appropriate.

Signature on File

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
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OVERVIEW – FY 2008 GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR (GWOT) REQUEST

The Department of Defense requests $141.7 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2008 to continue operations in the Global War on Terror (Figure 1).

The cumulative effect of five years of operations is creating strain on both personnel and equipment. This request provides funding for special pays and benefits for personnel to sustain the all-volunteer force; and it provides funding to maintain, repair or replace equipment lost, worn out or stressed by use.

Executing the GWOT has increased defense spending significantly over the course of the past five and one half years. Nonetheless, Defense spending is at the lowest level for any comparable period of conflict when measured as a percentage of U.S. gross domestic product or as a percentage of total federal spending (Figure 2).

U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

The goal of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is to establish stable, democratic and secure nations, with the institutions and resources needed for each nation to provide for its own security.

IRAQ

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve stability and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the government and people of Iraq.

Progress to Date

Iraq is the central front in the GWOT. Success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the extremist ideology that breeds international terrorism.

Since March 2003, Iraq has made significant progress in overcoming the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, in reviving Iraqi society, and establishing democratic rule. Iraq has achieved many significant milestones:

- March 2004: The Iraqi Governing Council approves the Transitional Administrative Law (interim constitution);

Figure 1. DoD Base Budget and GWOT FY01 to FY08

Note: FY 2007 base budget is a projection pending action on the continuing resolution.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

**Figure 2. Defense Spending in Context**

- June 2004: A free Iraqi becomes head of state of a sovereign nation as the Coalition Provision Authority closes down;
- January 2005: Iraqis elect a Transitional National Assembly in the 1st free election in 50 years;
- October 2005: Iraqis ratify a new permanent Constitution;
- December 2005: Iraqis elect the Council of Representatives (CoR), which in turn forms the first government under the permanent constitution;
- July 2006: Iraqis assume responsibility from Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) for the security of Muthanna province, the first to be transferred to Iraqi civilian control;
- September 2006: The GoI stands up the military Joint Headquarters and the Ground Forces Command, which assumes command and control of a portion of its armed forces.

**Military Achievements**

By the end of 2006, the Coalition had trained and equipped 328,500 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to varying levels of readiness, which include the Army, local and national police, border guards and specialized units. The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and are demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations. Eight division headquarters, 31 brigade headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in their areas of operation. In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) assumed control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and three of 10 Iraqi Army divisions. (The other divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007). In total, 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”
Political Achievements
Following popular approval of the Iraqi constitution in October 2005 and elections in December 2005, the leaders of Iraq’s major political parties formed a unity government. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki announced and won Council of Representatives (CoR) approval for his cabinet, which include representatives from all major regions, sects, and ethnic groups. This completed the political transition process laid out in the Transitional Administrative Law and endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. The Iraqi CoR has taken important steps toward passing key legislation to implement the Constitution.

Economic Achievements
The GoI continues to face serious challenges in the execution of its own budget and program. While the GoI has made only incremental progress in economic reform, it remains committed, and has implemented some positive, concrete steps, such as raising gas prices and passing important legislation, including the Fuel Import Liberalization Law and the Investment Law.

Strategic Partnership
The U.S. bilateral relationship with Iraq is evolving as the GoI and Iraqi security forces become increasingly capable of providing for the security needs of their country.

UNSCR 1723 extended the mandate of the MNF-I until the end of December 2007. In his letter to the UNSC president requesting the extension, Prime Minister Maliki said that while security and stability in Iraq are the responsibility of the GoI, this vision for the future of Iraq can only become reality with the help of the international community.

Much Remains To Be Done
From August to November 2006, the total number of attacks on Coalition forces increased 22 percent. While Coalition forces were the main target of attacks (68 percent), the overwhelming majority of casualties were suffered by Iraqis.

Violence in Iraq is divided along ethnic, religious, and tribal lines, and political factions within these groups. Concern regarding civil war runs high among the Iraqi population.

The number of infrastructure attacks continues to decrease, but lack of recovery from the cumulative effects of these attacks, combined with ineffective repair and maintenance of the infrastructure, impede the delivery of essential services and undermine the legitimacy of the GoI among the Iraqi people.

Shift in the Operational Theater
Operations, which have shifted from deposing a brutal dictator, to fighting insurgents, to preventing a civil war, have been complicated by a combination of factors including militias, death squads, and a fledgling government in need of Coalition help. While longing for independence and self determination, the Iraqi people do not want the U.S. and Coalition forces to leave before the job is complete. Moderates of all communities see Coalition forces as a source of protection against extremists.

Reassessment of United States Government (USG) Policy
Success in Iraq is critical to U.S. national security. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and for the region.

Failure would result in:
- An emboldened Al Qaeda movement;
- Strengthened Iranian and Syrian influence;
- A loss of confidence in the U.S. among key allies in the region; and
- A severe setback to U.S. credibility, freedom of maneuver, and influence in the region and throughout the world.
In short, U.S. failure would put American security and safety of the American people at greater risk.

It is critical to U.S. national security that Iraq achieve the ability to govern, secure and sustain itself, and be an ally in the struggle against extremism. It is also critical the U.S. aggressively prosecute the fight in Iraq against Al Qaeda and its associated movements.

Most important for long-term political stability is the success of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. Without progress among political, religious, tribal, and sectarian leaders toward reconciliation, security achieved by military means are not sustainable.

THE PRESIDENT’S NEW STRATEGY

The President's new Iraq strategy is rooted in six fundamental elements: first, let the Iraqis lead; second, help the Iraqis protect the population; third, isolate the extremists; fourth, create space for political progress; fifth, diversify the political and economic efforts; and sixth, employ a regional approach to the problem.

Security

The Iraqis should publicly acknowledge that all parties in Iraq are responsible for quelling sectarian violence. The Iraqis should:

- Work with the Coalition to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi people;
- Deliver the necessary Iraqi forces to secure Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference once they are in place;
- Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis;
- Plan and fund the eventual demobilization program for militias.

The Coalition must agree that political progress depends upon an Iraq able to provide for its own security. All parties should agree to provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this goal. The Coalition should increase efforts to support those tribes that are willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar and accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.

The Coalition and the Iraqis should continue their counterterror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations and take more aggressive action against death squad networks. The Coalition should accelerate transition efforts to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.

The U.S. and Coalition should increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions Headquarters, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions. Together they should establish a National Operations Center, a National Counterterrorism Force, and a National Strike Force as well as help reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.

Political

The Government of Iraq should commit to reforming its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery and to act on promised reconciliation initiatives such as the oil law, de-Baathification law and Provincial elections. Authority should be given to Coalition and the ISF to pursue all extremists. All Iraqi leaders should support reconciliation and a moderate coalition must emerge as a strong base of support for unity government.

The Coalition should build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds as part of a broader effort to support political moderates so they can take on the extremists. Another responsibility is to support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the...
lead. The Coalition should diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad and provide more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders. Efforts should include expansion and increased flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at the local level to open opportunities for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.

Together, the Coalition and Iraqis should establish a partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the U.S. in which all parties understand expectations and responsibilities. All should strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption and build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations. All should work to make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraqi communities on an impartial basis.

**Economic**

The Iraqis should deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities. This includes focusing more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth, capitalizing and executing jobs-producing programs and matching U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer-term sustainable Iraqi programs. Finally, the Iraqis should enact laws, such as the hydrocarbons law, to promote investment.

The Coalition should refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas critical to the success of the Government of Iraq (e.g. budget execution, key ministries). It should decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone including the doubling of the number of PRTs and civilians and establishing PRT-capability within Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Finally, the Coalition should integrate economic strategy with military effort, including joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT, and remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.

**Regional**

The Iraqis should vigorously engage Arab states and take the lead in establishing a regional forum to provide support and assistance from the neighborhood. Furthermore, it should counter negative foreign activity in Iraq and increase efforts to counter the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

The Coalition should increase its military presence in the region and, in particular, intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq. It should also strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region and continue to seek the region’s full support in the Global War on Terror and for the Government of Iraq. Finally, the coalition should continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.

Together, the Coalition and the Iraqis will focus on the International Compact and retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.
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This security plan is designed to have Iraqi forces lead a campaign, with U.S. and Coalition forces in support, to protect the population of Baghdad from intimidation and violence instigated by Sunni and Shi’a extremist groups and to enable the Government of Iraq to take the difficult steps necessary to address that nation’s underlying issues. This means, above all, strengthening those in Iraq who are prepared to address its problems peacefully against extremists who use violence to disrupt Iraq and pursue radical ideologies.

Ministry of Defense Forces

Under the revised strategy, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces will be trained and equipped to be principally responsible for quelling sectarian violence. They will lead the effort against militias and all lawless forces, with Coalition support as required. Coalition forces, with Iraqi forces in support, will be responsible for operations to defeat Al Qaeda and associated movements. The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time continues training and equipping of MoD forces. The force is comprised of a 137,000 soldier/10 division Army, a basic infantry force with limited mechanized capability, support units, a small air force for reconnaissance and logistics and a small coastal patrol force.

This program builds on the current successes of MoD forces. The Iraqis have fought bravely with Coalition forces and have the respect of many of the Iraqi people. Program specifics include: force enhancements to include 33,000 trained Iraqi soldiers, sailors and airmen in FY2007; logistics capabilities to build strategic/operational-level support units, sustainment stocks, maintenance capability and transport equipment; combat support units to include engineering units, counter-IED capabilities, military intelligence companies, Military Police and headquarters service companies; Mobility/Force Protection to include pure combat support wheeled vehicles and infrastructure survivability and equipment upgrades/interoperability with the U.S. such as assault rifles; machine guns; night vision, howitzers, mortars, airlift, air assault, UAVs, and offshore naval capability.

Ministry of Interior Forces

Under the revised strategy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces will be trained and equipped like MoD forces. They will have lead responsibility for quelling sectarian violence and will lead in the effort against militias, with Coalition support as required. Community policing, safeguarding the public, and providing internal security at the local level remains important for long-term success in achieving rule of law. The U.S. will create robust DoD advisory teams within MoI forces by embedding U.S. advisors down to the army battalion/police station level. The U.S. will also press senior Iraqi officials to emphasize national priorities over ethno-sectarian groups in hiring and command selection.

The program accelerates the hand-over of responsibility, while at the same time continues the training and equipping of MoI forces. The program funds force structure increases, such as 4,000 police for forensic specialties in FY2007; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Vehicles and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), tactical gear and body armor; National Police reform training, including rule of law/ethics training, leader development and National Police transformation; investigation capability, including surveillance system equipment; and life support capability, the development of an MoI logistics structure, and infrastructure sustainment.

AFGHANISTAN

Progress to Date

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, we started with two missions: defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan, and – with the Afghan people and the international
community – create a stable, moderate democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.

It is hard to comprehend how destitute Afghanistan was at that time. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage. Significant progress has been made toward accomplishment of those two missions.

Military Achievements

Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer an open sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While Afghanistan remains a central front in OEF, on October 5, 2006, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. ISAF now accounts for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other spoilers that are attempting to derail progress.

Political Achievements

Afghanistan now has a democratically elected and representative government and has met each Bonn Accord milestone laid out in December 2001. In January 2004, the Afghanistan Constitution was signed into law, including provisions to protect individual rights for men and women. In October 2004 Afghans elected a President. And in September 2005 Afghans elected a National Assembly. During the National Assembly’s first session, the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) confirmed 20 ministers and two Supreme Court justices and passed a national budget.

The GoA is extending its reach by providing services to the Afghan people and building national institutions. At least five million students are enrolled in schools, a 500 percent increase since 2001, of which 40 percent are women and girls. Over 80 percent of the population now has access to at least basic healthcare.

Economic Achievements

The Afghan economy has been growing steadily. It was valued at $2.4 billion in 2002. The estimate for 2006 is $7.3 billion. Both the economy and Afghan government revenues are projected to continue to rise in the future. The Afghan people are seeing the impact: Per capita income has doubled since 2001, and agricultural opportunities are increasing.

Strategic Partnership

The U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral relationship has grown significantly. The two countries now share a close friendship, united not only in the Global War on Terror, but also by common interests and values. In May 2005, President Bush and President Karzai reaffirmed our commitment and signed the Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership.

Much Remains to be Done

Afghanistan remains the target of terrorist groups, remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements, drug traffickers, and a determined criminal element. This past year, a resurgent Taliban focused on testing the expanding ISAF forces, but ISAF and ANSF demonstrated that they will stand, fight, and defeat the Taliban attacks.

A significant increase in narcotics production in 2006 highlights a significant challenge ahead. Drugs and drug money also threaten to corrupt and undermine the new institutions of the Afghan state.
The greatest challenge lies in fostering the overall conditions that will give the Afghan people confidence that their elected government, supported by the international community, will deliver long-term security and stability. Five years after the start of OEF, the people of Afghanistan have increased hopes and expectations.

**A Shift in the Strategic Environment**

This past year’s increase in violence and narcotics production represents a shift in the strategic environment. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the GoA enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the United States, in cooperation with ISAF partners, must accelerate and increase our efforts if Afghanistan is to succeed. The U.S. government has identified areas where efforts can be increased, expanded, and/or better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity, and providing security in Afghanistan.

**Implications for Security Sector**

For the security sector in particular, more needs to be done in response to the resurgent Taliban. Operations by U.S. and international forces last summer faced the enemy in larger-scale operations and more intense fighting. The strategy of a series of operations and ISAF’s Operation Medusa focused on denying the enemy safe havens, interdicting its movement, and targeting its routes. The ANSF played an increasingly important role as these operations progressed.

The combat phases of these operations, however, were only the precursors to efforts focused on extending the authority of the GoA and strengthening the rule of law, reconstruction programs, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are a key element of our military strategy in Afghanistan. CERP provides the commander the funds required to bring needed assistance and reconstruction to areas that have been affected by conflict. Unlike other U.S. resources, CERP provides a quick impact and demonstrates immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan.

The shift in the strategic environment also highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. In order to enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban, the ANSF Train and Equip program must be accelerated to expand the size and capabilities of these forces. The desired end state for the ANSF remains a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable force, less reliant on international assistance and more capable of taking the fight to the Taliban.

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Under the revised program, the ANA will be trained and equipped to provide for internal security and to assume leadership for counterinsurgency and internal operations.

The program builds on current success of the ANA. Afghan soldiers have fought bravely side-by-side with the international forces and won the respect of the Afghan people, despite less-reliable weapons and weaker force protection.

Soldiers will be armed with reliable and more capable weapons including assault rifles, machine guns, and mortars. Soldiers will also receive body armor, Kevlar helmets, armored vehicles, and advanced first aid kits to ensure care for those who are injured.

The final Afghan National Army will include better capabilities, including a small, capable air corps. Six battalions will receive specialized training to become the rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission. In addition, the Army will include combat support units, consisting of engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The revised program recognizes that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters following combat. The original ANP program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable to address a security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

Compared with the ANA, the ANP has lagged in progress due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay. Under this plan the ANP will receive additional attention and resources.

The Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A) program will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving Afghanistan’s interdiction capabilities. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment.

Additionally, a new unit will be established to fill a gap in ANP capability. The Civil Order Police (COP) will be established as a specialized unit, with tactical gear, specialized equipment, and improved force protection, and to be the rapid response force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots.
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The Way Ahead

The U.S. cannot achieve or sustain these ANSF objectives alone. The GoA has committed to providing the manpower to meet these objectives. Equally important, the Afghan leaders have committed to make the necessary security sector reforms that will ensure that the ANSF are responsible and lasting institutions. Through ventures like the Border Management Initiative, the United States is also helping the GoA to increase revenues, which will provide a source of income to support and sustain the forces.

The international community also has a role in building the ANSF. Millions of dollars of equipment have been donated by countries for both the ANA and the ANP. Germany has played a key part with its police training program, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-the-field mentoring. NATO is also exploring near- and long-term ways that it can assist with equipping and training.

SUMMARY

The Department of Defense has a long history of engaging in “irregular warfare,” but that experience has been based on limited engagements and for limited periods of time, normally in association with conventional military operations. No previous conflict has been as global in nature, with such a wide range of adversaries, and in such a complex battle space.

DoD has succeeded in engaging opponents who employed unconventional or asymmetric capabilities in a variety of scenarios in the last century. Our military forces continue to apply lessons learned from this experience. Guided by the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror (NMSP-WOT), the Department has made progress toward each of its strategic objectives. Continued success depends on timely Congressional support for this GWOT request.
JUSTIFICATION – FY 2008 GWOT REQUEST

These justification materials are presented by functional category for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The categories are linked to the appropriation accounts through which the Department typically requests its funding, but they provide a clearer understanding and increased transparency into overall expenditures on the war effort.

CONTINUING THE FIGHT

Operations ($70.6B)

The Operations request will fund the incremental costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008. It includes funding for aircraft flying hours, Navy steaming days, Army vehicle miles used in the conduct of operations on a daily basis. It covers special pays, benefits, medical supplies, and subsistence costs – food, water, and ice – for about 140,000 troops deployed in Iraq and about 20,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan. This category pays for transportation inter- and intra-theater, including long haul supply flights from the United States to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Operations category also pays for the cost of forward deployed forces in places like Qatar and Kuwait, and for pre-deployment costs.

Force Protection ($11.2B)

In the GWOT, military capabilities are not the primary targets of terrorists. Rather, people -- particularly military personnel -- are the primary targets. As a result, terrorists can select their targets at a time and place of their choosing. This in turn requires the United States to maintain a robust posture 24 hours per day.

Accordingly, it is critical that U.S. troops are protected from the many and varied terrorist threats. This includes providing effective lightweight body armor, armored vehicles, safe and secure operating bases, identity management for access control, and persistent surveillance capabilities.

Force protection is both a natural extension of protecting and defending the homeland and a key enabler of all military strategic objectives in the war on terror. To succeed in the GWOT, the U.S. military must have the best force protection equipment and latest technology available.

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat ($4.0B)

The IED request will fund action against components of the IED system, the IED makers, the trainers, and supporting

FY 2008 GWOT Request: $141.7B

Source: FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request
infrastructures. This funding will help counter the effects of all forms of IEDs used against the U.S. and Coalition forces. It includes equipment and materials used in the field for attacking the IED threat.

IEDs have become the weapon of choice of terrorists. They are the number one killer of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and are the greatest emerging threat in Afghanistan. They pose a highly lethal and growing threat which is asymmetric in nature and extremely difficult to counter by conventional means. Ongoing investment in technologies that defeat these weapons is crucial to the security of U.S. forces. Also, the United States must continue to invest in intelligence, information operations, and training, which enable the identification and targeting of bombmaking networks.

Military Intelligence ($2.7B)
A key enabling priority of the NMSP-WOT is to improve traditional and non-traditional intelligence operations. Continuous enhancement of intelligence capabilities is required to understand the complex and clandestine organizational structure and operating systems of terrorists. With this knowledge comes the ability to best identify enemy vulnerabilities. Using these vulnerabilities we can then rapidly defeat the enemy.

Military reliance upon both current intelligence and long-term analysis is both unprecedented and growing. Adversaries are fully aware of our reliance upon information, and they are developing capabilities to counter our access and match our abilities. Although the United States has numerous efforts underway to improve and expand current intelligence capabilities, the intelligence requirements of commanders on the ground should be met both to provide for the security of U.S. and Coalition forces and to enable access to a wide variety of targets.

Iraqi Security Forces ($2.0B)
The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve peace and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as the development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the Iraqi government and people.

By January 2007, the Coalition had trained and equipped 328,500 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which include the Army, the local and national police, border guards and specialized units. (Not included are approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 different ministries). The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility and demonstrating an increased capability to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations. Eight Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions that have assumed...
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the lead in their areas of operation for counterinsurgency operations. In September 2006, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) came under the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and assumed command and control of the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and 3 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions. The other divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007. In total, 106 Iraqi Army combat battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”

Afghan Security Force ($2.7B)

When Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, the United States and its Coalition partners started with two missions:

- Defeat Al Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan; with the Afghan people and the international community, create a stable, moderate democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.

It is hard to comprehend the destitution present in Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage.

Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer an open sanctuary for Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While Afghanistan remains a central front in the Global War on Terror, on October 5, 2006, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. ISAF now accounts for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other forces that are attempting to derail progress.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are steadily growing in strength and capability. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and an effort that requires consistent support.

Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done, and U.S. strategy reflects shifts in the strategic environment. This past year’s increase in violence and narcotics production represents one such a shift. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the Afghan government enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the United States is accelerating and increasing efforts to meet its objectives for Afghanistan. The Administration has identified areas where efforts can be increased, expanded, and/or better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity and providing security.

Coalition Support ($1.7B)

Wherever possible, the United States works with or through Coalition partners. Training and equipping partner nations institutionalizes the skills and alliances needed for the Global War on Terror, and is key to the long-term success of the GWOT. As partner nations enhance their counterterrorism capabilities at home and in their regions, U.S. forces can increasingly disengage, deploying only to critical areas of responsibility or to train partners.

Reimbursing allies, providing lift and sustainment support, and increasing funds to train and equip are the most effective tools for enabling partner nations to counter terrorism. Investment in this area lessens the length and the cost of the GWOT.
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Commander’s Emergency Response Program ($1.0B)

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) supports Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. CERP provides ground commanders with funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction in their areas of responsibility. The Program supports GWOT by helping to win the trust of local populations by improving urgent civil infrastructures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Military Construction ($0.7B)

This request includes $0.7 billion for construction projects in support of OIF and OEF. Included are projects to support military operations, to improve force protection, and improve waste management, and to construct needed medical and supply facilities.

RECONSTITUTING THE FORCE

Reconstitution ($37.6B)

Reconstitution of the force replenishes consumables, as well as replaces, repairs and maintains all equipment destroyed, damaged or stressed in support of operations Iraq and Afghanistan. Reconstitution is central to maintaining U.S. military warfighting capabilities. As equipment is damaged in the GWOT, it is replaced or repaired so that the equipment is put back into operation. All forces are reconstituted as equipment and supplies are used. This includes aircraft and heavy combat equipment such as tanks, helicopters, and assault vehicles.

In addition, reconstitution includes equipment procured to provide additional enhanced capabilities. This equipment includes a wide range of items, across multiple warfighting functions. For example, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are being procured to replace lightly protected trucks. In addition, the request will provide increased survivability and defense capabilities for aircraft flying in theater and also improve our ability to counter IEDs.

This request includes funding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs to be able to respond to unique situations for which a technological capability is not currently available. It includes funding for the development of force protection equipment, to include better detection systems and materials better able to absorb damage. Funding is also being requested to improve the performance of unmanned systems in a desert environment, the development of wide area detection and surveillance technologies to mitigate insurgent activities, and the development of automated language translation systems.

ENHANCING GROUND FORCES

Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams / Establish Regimental Combat Team ($1.6B)

Much has been asked of U.S. ground forces, both the Army and Marines, in the past five years of the GWOT. As readiness for warfighting continues to be a concern, both Services have worked to improve the readiness and deployability of units and to provide a less stressful deployment schedule. Force structure improvements enable strategic flexibility for GWOT contingencies.

The FY 2008 GWOT request includes funding to accelerate the development of two Army Brigade Combat Teams and one Marine Regimental Combat Team, composed of three Marine battalions and enablers, to provide a critical increase to the rotational pool of forces for current operations, and to increase the presence on the ground.

Non-DoD Classified ($5.9B)

Details on this section will be provided separately to Congress in a classified annex.
**Operations**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure the men and women of the Armed Forces engaged in the Global War on Terror are appropriately compensated and have the funds, supplies, and logistical support they need to conduct military operations.

**Funding: $70.6B**
- Incremental pay, benefits and support for ~320,000 military personnel
- Military operations to include pre-deployment training, transportation inter- and intra-theater of operations, aircraft flying hours, ship steaming days, vehicle and ground miles
- Subsistence (food and water) and logistics support
- Operating and restocking supply depots
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

Operations

$ in Billions

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<td></td>
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<td>69.9</td>
<td>70.6</td>
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DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $70.6 billion for military operations and intelligence activities in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in FY 2008. This reflects a 1 percent increase over the FY 2007 total estimate. Operations costs are directly linked to the operational tempo of frontline combat and support forces in the theater. For budgeting purposes, this request assumes the same level of operational tempo in FY 2008 as in FY 2006.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Operations category supports the full spectrum of military personnel, operation and maintenance, supply, and fuel requirements for military Reserve Component (RC) mobilization, deployment and redeployment of all forces, as well as theater operations and sustainment. This request supports continued deployment of approximately 140,000 service members in Iraq and 20,000 in Afghanistan.

The FY 2008 GWOT request also supports continuous deployment of more than 15 Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and two Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces. It also supports the Airmen and Sailors who are augmenting forces. Of the Army BCTs, more than half are “heavy units,” equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that consume large amounts of resources (i.e., fuel, parts, supplies, etc.). The remaining combat forces, although designated as “light units,” are equipped with a full complement of vehicles and support equipment that includes trucks, trailers, generators, radars, and other items. Operations in theater remain high: U.S. forces are heavily engaged in fighting the insurgency, maintaining the peace, and training the new military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pay and Benefits

This request funds:

- Incremental pay and allowances for deployed active personnel (special pays);
- Subsistence;
- Permanent-change-of-station travel;
- Other military personnel costs for mobilizing Reserve component personnel, Active component overstrength, and Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) uniformed personnel deployed in support of contingency operations; and
- Recruiting and retention bonuses and incentives.

Major requirements are as follows:
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

Reserve Component Personnel on Active Duty: The force mix needed to support combat operations and the worldwide fight against terrorism includes a combination of Active Component units and Reserve Component personnel serving on active duty (mobilized under presidential call-up authority or serving in ADOS status). All basic military pay and entitlements – basic pay, basic allowance for housing, retired pay accrual, Social Security contributions, and incentive pay – are incremental to the base budget and are supported with additional GWOT appropriations.

Active Component Overstrength: In FY 2008, the Army and Marine Corps will maintain an increased end strength to meet GWOT deployment commitments and, in the case of the Army, to enable conversion to the modular force structure. As a result, military personnel costs are above the baseline appropriation, primarily in the area of pay and allowances.

Subsistence: Requested funds provide Subsistence-in-Kind – subsistence for dining facilities, operational rations, and augmentation rations – for all U.S. military forces deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Reserve and National Guard: Funds requested in the Reserve Component military pay appropriations provide primarily for pre-mobilization training and support, recruiting and retention, and family support programs for deployed forces.

Military Operations

The Operation and Maintenance appropriations for Active and Reserve requests are required to cover the costs of military operations including transportation, supplies, communications and fuel consumed in pre-deployment training and operations in theater. Operations funding includes requirements for incremental pre-deployment training and support, transportation to and from theater, operating tempo in theater, sustainment of equipment, and the full range of logistics and communications, and intelligence assets support. The Reserve Forces Operation and Maintenance appropriation funds incremental training and support costs prior to mobilization, recruiting and retention, and support programs for both deployed forces and their families. Detailed requirements are outlined in the supporting budget exhibits. Major subcategories of Operation and Maintenance include the following.

Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO): Provides fuel, supplies, repair parts, etc., for combat teams and supporting forces operating continuously in harsh conditions. Provides funds for:

- Army OPTEMPO funds the sustainment of light, mixed, and heavy unit equipment in the full range of Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support units conducting day-to-day operations in support of OIF and OEF Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Sustainment includes

A U.S. Army Soldier from 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment relays information to others members of his unit through his radio during an operation to neutralize the insurgency in Balad ruz, Iraq, with the cooperation of the Iraqi Army.

FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

forward deployment training, air and ground OPTEMPO facility support, organizational maintenance, and communications support. The Army incurs both direct and indirect OPTEMPO costs. Direct OPTEMPO costs include fuel, oil, repair parts, etc. Indirect OPTEMPO costs generally include combat training center support, Soldier support, training aids, devices, simulations and simulators and selected contracted logistics support, facilities and base support;  

- Naval Forces cover Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, aviation support (Carrier Air Wings and land-based Maritime Patrol and support aircraft) conducting Maritime Security Operations, Marines conducting the full range of Combat and Counterinsurgency operations, and Sailors on the ground providing Combat Support operations. This includes funding for materials/supplies, training, operating tempo (flying, steaming and ground equipment), C4I, facilities, and support to Coalition Forces;  

- Air Force operations include flying missions and ground operations, maintenance, communications, command and control, facility operations in theater, and support to Coalition forces;  

- U.S. Special Operations Command operations include funding for travel, billeting, deployment gear, emergency medical supplies and services; pre-deployment/forward deployment training; aviation parts, consumables, and fuel, Special Operations Forces (SOF) unique facility requirements; equipment maintenance; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); transportation support including sealift, inter-theater and channel cargo airlift, port handling/inland transportation, second destination charges, and commercial tenders used as transport carriers. Also civilian overtime and temporary overhires to support the incremental workload associated with OIF and OEF deployments.

In-Theater Base Support: Provides base operations services, supplies and equipment, maintenance and storage facilities, pre-deployment training support and the full range of activities at DoD bases supporting mobilization and deployment missions.  

In-Theater Maintenance: Provides for contract labor and repair parts for forward activities that perform maintenance and repair of such key systems as Unmanned Aircraft, Light Utility Helicopters, missiles and radar, Stryker combat vehicles, HMMWV and tank engines, the Armored Security Vehicle, and C130s.

Theater Communications and Intelligence: Funds critical strategic and tactical communications infrastructure in theater. Also supports intelligence activities, such as electronic warfare and sensor systems sustainment, and counter-intelligence programs. Includes requirements associated with the Army’s role as DoD executive agent for contract linguists and cultural advisors, and reconnaissance aircraft operations as well as upgraded Joint Intelligence Operations Centers to streamline information sharing among geographically separated headquarters.

Transportation: Supports deployment, sustainment, redeployment and reset of forces. Includes strategic lift by air and sea, port handling operations, and second destination transportation.  

Personnel Support Costs: Provides service members with family counseling and support services, such as extended child care, Military Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services in-theater; Rest and Recuperation (R&R) travel; and civilian special pays.

Services and Related Support: Provides for the Defense Agencies to support GWOT activities such as contract management and audit services in theater; secure credentials; personnel and support costs for military trials; and rewards for information provided by local nationals.
Subsistence and Logistics Support

These funds are requested to cover the costs of Logistics support in theater, e.g. operations of the theater bases for deployed troops and subsistence costs for civilians and contractors.

Theater Base Camp and Logistics Support: Includes Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) base camp and life support services – power generation, facilities management, billeting, dining services, latrines and waste management – at sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait.

Consumables: Funds the costs of food and other consumables for DoD civilians and DoD contractors deployed in theater.

Operating and Restocking Supply Depots

Funds are required to re-establish stocks of spare parts, including war reserve equipment, that have been released in support of the Global War on Terror.

- Army Working Capital Fund Supply: Funds replenishment of stocks issued to combat units deploying to OIF (Authorized Stockage List, Prescribed Load List, and Unit Basic Load). Also included are medical supplies for combat support hospitals and surgical teams. Additionally, funding is required to replace pre-positioned stocks and augment spares to support OIF demands;

- Defense-Wide Working Capital Supply: Funds Kuwait in-theater distribution and demilitarization operating costs within the AOR. Funds fuel losses experienced at tactical fuel sites and along fuel delivery routes due to combat losses. Funds transportation and delivery of fuel within the AOR.

SUMMARY

The request is required to continue the historical levels of operations. Without these funds, the military services will reduce the level of military operations. These actions would preclude success in Iraq and Afghanistan and would undermine future warfighting capabilities and undermine U.S. Security.
**Force Protection**

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide U.S. Armed Forces with the best protection and the latest technology against all forms of hostile action.

**Funding: $11.2B**
- Body armor and other personal protection items
- Equipment
  - Aircraft survivability components
  - Command and control equipment
  - Radios
  - Night vision equipment
- Armored vehicles and HMMWV Fragmentation Kits
**DESCRIPTION**

The FY 2008 GWOT request for Force Protection is $11.2 billion—a 2 percent decrease from the FY 2007 total of $11.4 billion. This funding level will ensure that U.S. forces are provided with the latest technology force protection equipment, to prevent the loss of life and to mitigate serious injury to those forces involved in combat.

The insurgency presents a dynamic threat that quickly adapts to the tactics and techniques employed by U.S. and coalition forces. In order to provide U.S. forces with the best protection possible, the DoD is continuously researching, testing and procuring the latest in force protection equipment, tactics, techniques, and technologies. The Department also disseminates lessons learned as rapidly as possible.

Force Protection requirements will continue until insurgent activity and hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces are reduced significantly. Funds utilized for Force Protection requirements directly impact the Department’s ability to save lives and increase the operational effectiveness of U.S. troops on the ground and others involved in combat.

**FUNDING REQUEST**

The request funds multiple requirements for passive and active protection for U.S. soldiers and DoD civilians. These needs include an array of specialized equipment intended to protect forces while maintaining a high level of force mobility and lethality.

**Body Armor**

*Individual Body Armor (IBA)*: The IBA provides an increased level of protection for forces on the ground and in the air. The Department is purchasing next generation body armor systems to take advantage of the latest technology.

Body armor is purchased in both individual sets and replacement parts and components. Body armor requirements have evolved from an initial basic vest with chest and back protection in FY 2004 (Outer Tactical Vest) combined with 2 rifle plates called Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). These were improved with Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (ESAPI). Also added were side, leg, and neck protection (Deltoid Auxiliary Protection System), which provides additional shoulder protection and protection against armor-piercing rounds. This level of body armor protection is the minimum protective level for all combat operations. It is worn to stop small arms and shrapnel wounds to the upper body area.

In addition, other personal protection not specifically labeled as body armor, includes a helmet (including the new Advanced Combat Helmet), earplugs, gloves, boots, and other items. This may result in problems in making year-to-year comparisons on

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**Force Protection**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Body Armor</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>Protection Equipment and Activities</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>-3%</td>
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<td><strong>11.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
<td>-2%</td>
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</table>
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

how many "sets" of body armor are procured each year. The following table reflects total whole sets of individual body armor, additional items and replacement parts.

Through FY 2008, the Department will have procured 100 percent of its requirements for Active, Reserve and National Guard units. Quantities above that level reflect replacement and outfitting with newer, enhanced body armor and components.

Advanced Combat Helmets (ACH) to Aircrew and Ground support personnel: The ACH outperforms the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) Kevlar helmet in survivability and injury avoidance. The ACH was initially tested by the Army and fielded to its deploying forces in May 2005. The ACH has better ballistic and impact protection, increased 9mm bullet protection, and improved field of vision and localization. The funding is required to continue the replacement of the existing PASGT with the ACH. In FY 2008, the initial procurement of Improved Advanced Combat Helmets will provide protection against 7.62 mm rounds.

Protection Equipment and Activities

Munitions clearance of unexploded and known ammunition caches: Request provides for the securing of sites and the removal, relocation, and destruction of munitions found inside Iraq. Program secures the known weapons caches, and continues with the destruction of enemy munitions and large ammunition dumps. Insurgents use munitions from stolen caches to construct IEDs. The destruction of such munitions has a direct impact on the insurgents’ ability to produce IEDs.

Fire-retardant clothing for protection against fuel-enhanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs): Fire-retardant “Nomex” uniforms designed to protect soldiers from fuel-based accelerants used in conjunction with IEDs. The fuel-based IEDs are inflicting serious burns to gunners and operators of tactical vehicles. The Nomex fabric provides protection up to 700 degrees Fahrenheit. Nomex adds an additional two to four seconds of fire protection for vehicle egress. The request will enable the Army to continue to provide soldiers with two sets of uniforms, gloves and a balaclava-type hood per gunner. The complete uniform ensemble will include: 154,000 Nomex Combat Vehicle Crewmember Coveralls (2 per service member), 154,000 Nomex Gloves (2 per service member), and 15,000 Nomex Balaclava Hoods (1 per gunner).

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<tr>
<th>SAPI / E-SAPI Equivalent Sets, Quantities</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>SOCOM</th>
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<td>FY 2004 through FY 2006 Baseline, Title IX and Supplemental</td>
<td>825,677</td>
<td>63,306</td>
<td>5,750</td>
<td>137,404</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>725</td>
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<td>FY 2007 Title IX</td>
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<td>25,000</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>10,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td>360,715</td>
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<td>9,875</td>
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<td>6,296</td>
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<td>1,740,988</td>
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<td>Totals FY 2004 - 2008</td>
<td>1,393,600</td>
<td>102,306</td>
<td>16,475</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>51,607</td>
<td>1,740,988</td>
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Newly fielded combat uniforms for desert warfare operations: Request provides ACU's for deployers to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Improved uniform capabilities include better camouflage and improved performance for desert warfare operations.

Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG): The AWG is the Army organization designed to study and provide recommendations to commanders on the ground for the neutralization and defeat of improvised explosive devices and other insurgent tactics to harm U.S. and coalition forces. The organization is actively engaged in real-time assessment and quick response solutions, and coordinates closely with the IED Defeat Organization.

Rapid Equipping Force (REF): The REF bridges the gap between the lengthy acquisition process and immediate warfighter needs. Specifically, the REF is charged to:

- Equip operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed and acquired quickly – ideally, within 90 days;
- Insert future force technology solutions that engaged and deploying forces require by developing, testing and evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions;
- Assess capabilities and advise Army stakeholders of findings that will enable forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy.

Major systems investments and force protection-unique research and development efforts include the following:

- Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The request funds the procurement of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). The UAS support night operations, counter-IED operations, convoy protection, and border surveillance. The ASE provides infrared countermeasures against man-portable air defense systems for Army aircraft flying in support of OIF/OEF;
- Dominant Maneuver: Funds increased Soldier survivability against an ever-evolving lethal threat by providing improved body armor, head protection, thermal weapon sights and night vision goggles. Additionally, the Army will procure Route Clearance Vehicles, which are critical to maintaining main supply routes, allowing combatant commanders freedom of movement and protecting U.S. Soldiers from IED attacks. The Army also will acquire Rapid Response Vehicles (Cougar) for deploying explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies;
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

- **Precision Strike:** The request funds continued procurement of counter-rocket/mortar radars, which are critical to protecting Soldiers from cannon, rocket and mortar fire. The funding will also continue to be used to purchase additional Bradley Fire Support team vehicles and Combat Observation and Lasing Team vehicles, which enhance the survivability of the forward observer teams that detect and deliver lethal fires against enemy targets;

- **Air Defense:** The request will enable the Army to increase its air and missile defense support to field commands, to include the ability to sense, warn, and defeat enemy rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) attacks;

- **Battle Command and Control:** Funding would procure network upgrades to support the deployed force. These include equipment that connects the warfighter to the Global Information Grid with voice, data and video. The request also would help the Army transition to high-speed internet connectivity down to the battalion level. It would provide fully digitized command posts and collaboration suites, and ensure shared Joint situational awareness for commanders at division and above.

**Aircraft Unique Procurements:** Funding would provide for:

- Outfitting mobility and transport aircraft with infrared defensive protection capabilities to prevent and reduce damage caused by hostile fire;
- A-10 AAR-47 kits, spares, and support equipment to improve survivability against infrared threats;
- Combat enhancements to keep the A-10 close air support viable over the 21st century battlefield;
- Combat Survivor/Evader Locator Combat Radios to eliminate a severe shortfall in quantities and capabilities;
- Upgrades to the EC-130H COMPASS CALL IED Defeat Subsystems to counter new threats by improving identification of IEDs by ground forces.

A “TIPS” hotline program for reporting insurgent activities: Request provides theater-wide intelligence operations aimed at preventing and reducing insurgent activities within OIF. The TIPS Hotline enables Iraqis to inform DoD personnel of insurgent activities in the local communities.

**Armored Vehicles**

The request funds the latest force protection technology for the entire inventory of vehicles exposed to combat. Highlights include add-on-armor kits to existing HMMVWs; new Armored Variant High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs); and Medium Mine Protected Vehicles.

**Focused Logistics:** The request procures next-generation tactical vehicles with inherent armor capabilities. It also covers the purchase of equipment used to maintain the operational status of systems and for fault isolation; a software uploader/verifier which restores or provides new software to weapon systems; and calibration support to ground TOW optical sight, tactical communication, aviation and missile systems.

**Full Dimension Protection:** The request procures systems, such as the Armored Security Vehicle and Chem/Bio protective masks, which enable Soldiers to perform security/force protection missions safely.

**SUMMARY**

Force protection is essential for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. troops. Without these funds – and the most robust body armor and protective equipment the money would buy – U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines will be placed unnecessarily in harms’ way.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to defeat IEDs as the enemy’s weapon of choice by attacking the IED network, defeating the device, and training our forces to defeat and disarm these weapons.

Funding: $4.0B
• Attack the Network
  – Counter Bomber
  – Counter Infrastructure
• Defeat the Device
  – Jammers
  – Detection Systems
  – Robots, Defusing Systems
• Train the Force
  – Personnel Training
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

### IED Defeat

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<td>Defeat the Device</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train the Force</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total IED Defeat</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7%</strong></td>
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*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

### DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $4.0 billion for defeating the IED threat to U.S. and Coalition forces for FY 2008, a 7 percent decrease from the FY 2007 total.

The use of improvised explosive devices has proven to be a particularly challenging threat to U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the past year, the enemy has increasingly used IEDs as their primary, and most effective, weapon of choice to exploit the vulnerabilities of militarily superior Coalition forces. Additionally, the enemy continues to evolve and adapt tactics, techniques and procedures in response to countermeasures. For example, the enemy has initiated the use of multiple triggering devices and various forms of explosive devices to defeat the improved armor on vehicles.

To address this threat comprehensively, the Department of Defense established Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Its mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of efforts by the Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

The funding requested for IED Defeat supports the following Lines of Operation:

- Attack the Network;
- Defeat the Device;
- Train the Force.

### FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2008 request would fund action against components of the IED system, the IED makers, the trainers, and supporting infrastructures. The request will help to counter the effects of all forms of IEDs used against the U.S. and Coalition forces. It includes equipment and materials used in the field for attacking the IED threat. In July 2005, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a process to validate and resource urgent operational needs of deployed combat units.

#### Attack the Network

The FY 2008 request will be used to meet the Joint Urgent Operating Needs (JUON) requests of the commanders in the field as well as JIEDDO research and development activities to counter the enemy’s use of IEDs. Critical items include the following:

- **Warrior Alpha:** Provides for day and night tactical airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to
provide division commanders with a better view of critical areas. It includes a full system of Ground Control Stations, (SATCOM) connections and remote video terminals for data dissemination, and full operations and maintenance contractor support;

- **Science and Technology for attacking IED Networks:** Connects various sensor systems and integrates them with command and control systems enabling the warfighter to conduct operations against IED networks;

- **Joint Center of Excellence:** Counters the increasingly sophisticated IED threat by providing relevant, world class, collective skills training; training on new technology; and integrating lessons learned for joint Coalition forces;

- **Counter IED Operational Integration Center (COIC):** Fuses intelligence products for targeting operations. The COIC develops analytical tools and analysis in near-real-time to support requirements of units;

- ** Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC):** Forms, equips, and trains a cell of analysts with forensics expertise. Includes miscellaneous consumables and lab equipment, tactical vehicles, and facility renovations to provide intelligence on enemy patterns and operators;

- **Counter IED Targeting Program (CITP):** Provides analysis, tools, techniques, and resources to increase the commanders in-theater capability to support fusion of intelligence products to target bomb maker networks.

**Defeat the Device**

The request funds efforts to (1) improve U.S. ability to detect IEDs at greater stand-off distances; (2) conduct research on counter-IED protective materials; and (3) conduct research and development of systems to detect and counter IED triggers at increasing ranges. Use of these funds affects all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition forces.

Funds will also support JIEDDO’s long and mid-range studies, assessments, modifications, and testing in support of field needs to mitigate the effects of IED detonations and other emerging physical threats. Specific efforts against the devices in FY 2008 will include the following:

- **Counter-IED Radio-Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW):** Supports requirements for technology development, production and insertion, upgrades, additional testing, field support, materials, operations, and support for fielding the current series of jammers to include Duke, Chameleon and Guardian. Supports simultaneous development and fielding of second generation jammers to ensure we can counter the evolving threat;

- **Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS):** Provides near-real-time surveillance of developing threats to improve speed, effectiveness, and safety of Quick Reaction Forces to find, fix, track, target, and engage direct and indirect fire threats;

- **“Eagle Eye” and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID):** Provides for a family of tower-based detection systems. These towers enhance mobile and fixed site security primarily for Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and force protection disposal teams working at ERW sites. Eagle Eye can also support offensive operations against IED emplacers;

- **Passive Infrared (PIR) Defeat Systems:** Provides systems to protect against passive infrared initiated IEDs;

- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Engineer Stand-off Camera Systems:** Provides units with standoff IED detection using electro-optical and infrared methods;
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

- **Ground Penetrating Radar:** Develops systems to detect buried IEDs from mobile vehicle platforms;

- Improvised Explosive Device Robot: Develops and tests communications equipment to increase the operating range of the Man-Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) Mk 1 and Mk 2;

- **“Cougar” Armor Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle:** Enables reconnaissance by Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel, which provides enhanced armor and underbelly protection against various types of IEDs;

- **Change Detection Monitoring (Systems):** Provides for a number of different systems that monitor changes in the battle environment to indicate possible location of IED threats to ground units.

### Train the Force

The request funds efforts for all JIEDDO personnel and those the Department supports whose success depends on actions of informed, properly trained, and adaptive units. Training enables commanders to use and synchronize technological solutions for attacking the network and defeating the explosive devices. Without adequate training, the effectiveness of other IED defeat initiatives cannot be fully maximized.

The JIEDDO is engaged in training individuals, battle staff training -- institutional training efforts, home-station training, pre-deployment training, as well as training advisors in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The JIEDDO’s training program directly supports the combatant commanders’ mission and priorities. This request also supports known JUONs for the CENTCOM Commander as well as training technologies to support other Joint training efforts.

- **Joint Center of Excellence:** Counters the increasingly sophisticated IED threat by providing relevant, world class, collective skills training, new technology training, and lessons learned integration for joint Coalition forces;

- **Counter IED Operational Integration Center (COIC).** Provides intelligence fusion into operational training solutions and programs.

### SUMMARY

The Global War on Terror request covers planned FY 2008 initiatives and emerging Joint Urgent Operating Needs identified by field commanders who are required to defeat improvised explosive devices and protect U.S. troops against the quickly evolving, asymmetrical threats that have proven to be the single most effective weapon against our deployed forces.

US Army SPC 4th Class Vance Crawford, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 506th Regimental Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, stands next to fused 105 mm Howitzer rounds while participating in a live-fire training exercise at FOB Warrior, Kirkuk, Iraq.

DoD photo by: JO1 Jeremy L Wood, USN
Military Intelligence

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to support warfighting units with timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence.

Funding: $2.7B
• Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
• All-Source Intelligence Analysis
• Counterintelligence (CI)
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
• Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
• Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
• Multidisciplinary Intelligence
• Operational Support
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
• Training
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

Military Intelligence

$ in Billions

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Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $2.7 billion for military intelligence programs vital to the conduct of the Global War on Terror for FY 2008, a 23% decrease from FY 2007.

FUNDING REQUEST

This request is critical to providing deployed units and next-to-deploy units with access to real-time, operationally focused intelligence. Funds support the intelligence activities of all the Services and the Defense intelligence agencies involved in the war effort, including: the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Counterintelligence Field Activity Office. The details of this request are included in a classified annex provided separately to the Congress. These programs do not include those requested within the National Intelligence Program led by the Director of National Intelligence.

Military Intelligence

The Military Intelligence request is presented according to the following intelligence disciplines:

- Airborne ISR;
- All-Source Intelligence;
- Counterintelligence (CI);
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT);
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT);
- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT);
- Multidisciplinary Intelligence;
- Operational Support;
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT);
- Training.

Airborne ISR: This discipline includes activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of airborne sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. The MIP request would fund procurement of and modifications to platforms such as the Guardrail Common Sensor, U-2, Predator and Global Hawk in order to provide critical capabilities to the forces engaged in OIF, OEF and the Global War on Terror.

In particular, the Air Force request will provide key ISR platform and system field service support, aircraft/equipment maintenance contracts, and repair/replenishment of various AF military intelligence program (MIP) systems, platforms, and sensors. These funds are critical to sustain current battlespace awareness capabilities and operator proficiencies across multiple intelligence disciplines, and to prevent intelligence capability gaps in an ever-increasing operational tempo environment. Additional funding is requesting ISR capabilities in order to provide the direct intelligence support on which the COCOM warfighters depend.

The ISR MIPs provide a diverse set of “multi-INT” capabilities and reachback support for COCOMs engaged in the GWOT; particularly CENTCOM. The Air Force ISR assets, including U-2,
Global Hawk, Predator, RJ-135, Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), SCATHE View, and Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS), provide critical intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination for combat operations in both operation OIF and OEF. For example, DCGS provided multi-INT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, and correlation operations support for over 3,800 U-2, Global Hawk, and Predator sorties in 2006. These Air Force MIP ISR capabilities ensure that the warfighter has the real-time (or near-real-time) time-sensitive targeting, force protection (to include Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices), threat warning, and overall situational awareness they need, and directly improve joint warfighter and operational commanders combat effectiveness.

**All-Source Intelligence:** This discipline funds activities that support the production of finished intelligence products by incorporating all sources of intelligence, to include human, signals, imagery, etc. The MIP request would fund efforts across the Services and Agencies, but particularly at the Combatant Commands (part of the DIA request). These funds are primarily in support of contracted analytic efforts and related operations tempo to enable these efforts to function 24/7 in support of operations around the world.

**Counterintelligence (CI):** The CI discipline covers information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. In particular, the MIP request would fund efforts in the Services, CIFA and DIA to support force protection, CI analysis and operations in theater, as well as CI training for deploying forces. The request funds a broad array of counterintelligence capabilities and projects in direct support of deployed forces like Counter Intelligence (CI) Support to Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies (CICODA) to provide direct CI analysis and production support to the Combatant Commands, Military Services, and Defense Agencies around the world. It provides near real-time intelligence and analytic support to protect DoD and other USG personnel, dependents, and assets against terrorist attacks and exploitation by foreign intelligence services. CI support to critical information infrastructure enables response teams to collect evidence and conduct forensic analysis of IT incidents and intrusions, which assist in maintaining the integrity and security of highly sensitive networks and communications lines. CI support to technical services responds to the increased demand for CI technical services and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capabilities in response to GWOT requirements. CI support to Force Protection (CIFP) supports existing Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) efforts in the Philippines and the newly inaugurated DOMEX operations in Malaysia and Indonesia.

These funds support contracted efforts to sustain CI operations and training, as well as some equipment purchases to enable information sharing across components engaged in CI activities.


DoD photo by: SPC James B. Smith Jr, USA
Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT): This discipline includes intelligence information collected from and provided by human sources. The MIP request would support evolving the counterintelligence and HUMINT architectures (hardware, communications, training, software), integrate standardized operational systems, identify technical requirements for the future force, and bolster cover and cover mechanisms. These efforts are being undertaken in the Army, DIA, and CIFA. For the Army in particular, this request sustains contract support in the development and revision of CI/HUMINT doctrine for CI source operations, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), polygraph support, biometrics, Offensive Foreign Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO), and the restructuring of the Army CI Case Control Office and the Theater Sub-Case Control Offices.

Additionally, the request continues to support HUMINT training, contract instructors and support personnel to produce 97E HUMINT Collectors, 97B CI Agents, the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC) and automated classroom support to produce functional and leader development training as well as capabilities development in CI/HUMINT.

The request funds the establishment of and support for the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) that supports specialized Intelligence training for U.S. military personnel assigned to the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) Transition Teams to train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Additionally, the requested funds resource analytical support in direct support of deployed forces to develop targeting packages to focus and vector HUMINT operations on high priority, high value targets.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): The IMINT refers to intelligence derived from the collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or_electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. The MIP request includes IMINT efforts primarily through National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA), which allow warfighters to "see" the battlefield, an essential capability for combating terrorism and providing quality mission planning information in the theater of operations. The funds support the procurement and operation of mobile, deployable exploitation tools as well as contracted support to enable effective and timely access of IMINT by the forces on the ground. In particular, the request supports imagery Exploitation Capability workstations, Full Motion Video (FMV) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and moving target indicator distance learning. Additionally, the request supports units in the field prior to deployment and sustainment training of FMV UAV intelligence exploitation operations.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT): The MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. The MASINT capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. The MASINT provides insights into the areas of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan that other intelligence sensors cannot. The MIP request supports force protection, counter-targeting, persistent surveillance, and the reduction of combat risk by funding sensors, sustaining their operation, and providing warfighters the tools to access and utilize the sensor data collected in the field. The request funds imagery products to Army Space Support Teams and Commercial Exploitation Teams deployed in the theater.

The requested funds support maintenance, spare parts, repairs and sustainment of older systems, critical for maintaining continuity for the war effort and ensuring no production breaks for critical equipping of sensor systems.
Multidisciplinary Intelligence: This discipline refers to the collection and processing of information by two or more disciplines, such as SIGINT and IMINT. The MIP request would fund the procurement and sustainment of platforms and systems such as the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Trojan Spirit in the Army, several direction-finding and communications interception efforts in the Navy, and digital mapping and targeting in the Air Force.

Operational Support: This discipline funds those activities that provide general, financial, and administrative functions, including logistics, comptroller, legal and audit functions, personnel management, facilities costs (utilities, leases, maintenance, and purchase), basic and applied research and development activities required to support intelligence operations, public information, medical services, supply operations, PCS and non-operational travel, base services, and property disposal. This MIP request includes sustainment of 24/7 intelligence staff support at critical operational locations, IT infrastructure support (such as the provision of SCI communications and internet capability to forces on the ground), and some training infrastructure, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): The SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. SIGINT provides Force Protection/Indications and Warning products in support of deployed forces in the theater, followed by target development, analysis and reporting of logistics, support and recruitment networks. The MIP request would fund equipment and operations, primarily in the Army, Air Force, and NSA, to equip forces with systems such as Trojan and Prophet, and to allow them to apply the information collected from these systems to ongoing operations. The TROJAN Data Network facilitates all-source analysis and SCI reach back for warfighters in support of OIF/OEF. TROJAN Classic XXI capability provides unmanned signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems in forward deployed locations, providing Actionable Intelligence to Combatant Commanders and National Users. The request provides IT personnel support to TROJAN system users worldwide at the TROJAN Network Control centers, supporting approximately 400 terminals. The request provides operational management and oversight of TROJAN systems to include firewalls, router password management, Internet protocol address space, network scanning and patching, and TROJAN Bandwidth Available Upon Demand (TBAUD) assignments. The request also funds training and target familiarization to forces deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa.

Training: This discipline covers efforts throughout all components to provide deploying forces, as well as deployed forces, with training in intelligence collection, exploitation and analysis, as well as way to utilize intelligence and related equipment when in the field. The MIP request would fund contracted support and personnel-related costs to ensure our forces are trained in the latest equipment and tactics, techniques and procedures. In addition, the request seeks funds to support Army Red Teaming training to enable our forces to learn to think like the opponents they will be facing in theater.

SUMMARY
Without these funds, essential surveillance against the Iraqi insurgency will not be conducted, or it will not be as thorough or as effective. For example, intelligence on IEDs will be reduced, leading to more deaths and injuries in the theater. Similarly, curtailed investments in critical theater-level collection systems, such as UAVs, will undermine the safety and effectiveness of U.S. forces.
Iraq Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Iraq until it can defend its own institutions independently.

Funding: $2.0B
- Enhance logistics capability, equipment, and sustainment of ground forces
- Enhance Army and Naval capabilities
- Provide training in logistics and maintenance
- Continue enhancing the objective Civil Security Force
- Continue development of ministerial functions
The Department of Defense requests $2.0 billion for support Iraq Security Forces (ISF) in FY 2008, a 64 percent decrease from FY 2007. The request builds upon the Department’s FY 2007 $5.5 billion investment, and assumes that by FY 2008, the Government of Iraq (GoI) will have taken on primary financial responsibility for sustaining the ISF. The FY 2008 request funds continued enhancements to the ISF, focusing on training and modern equipment necessary to achieve self-reliance.

The goal of the United States and its Coalition partners, in support of the Government of Iraq, is the establishment of conditions that will enable the Iraqi people to achieve peace and national unity. Stability in Iraq requires coordinated efforts in political and economic development, as well as the development of more capable security forces. Ultimately, success in these efforts lies with the Iraqi government and people.

As of January 2007, the Coalition has trained and equipped 328,500 members of the ISF, which include the Army, the local and national police, border guards, and specialized units. The ISF are increasingly taking the operational lead, assuming primary area security responsibility, and they are demonstrating
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

an increased capability to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations. Eight Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Headquarters, and 94 Iraqi Army battalions have assumed the lead in their areas of responsibility for counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) came under the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in September 2006 and assumed command and control of the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, and 3 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions. The remaining divisions are scheduled to come under the IGFC in 2007. In total, 106 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions and 12 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are “in the fight.”

FUNDING REQUEST

Iraq Security Forces

The Department of Defense’s main goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqis build and sustain ISF institutional capability and to generate a professional and capable ISF. Over the coming years, the U.S. military, along with our Coalition partners will continue to build, enhance and develop the ISF to full operational capability. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must partner with the Iraqis and the Coalition to provide long-term training and funding for modernization and sustainment of the ISF. The program maintains the current force, adapts for changed conditions, and accelerates future capability. More importantly, the training will respond to the changing threat by building capability sooner and accelerating completion of the program. This allows the U.S. to shape the foundation for the U.S. and Iraq long-term security relationship. Delays in ISF development increase both the security risk and the long-term cost to the United States Government.

The FY 2008 request builds upon the FY 2007 investment and attempts to accomplish the following priorities:

- Continue Ministerial Development and advisory functions;
- Continue enhancing Iraqi Air and Naval capabilities;
- Develop Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IEDD) capabilities;
- Modernize Equipment Density - Standardize weapons and vehicle fleets.

Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Iraqi MoD forces are being trained and equipped to assume responsibility for quelling sectarian violence and leading the effort against militias and all lawless groups, with Coalition support as required. Iraqi forces, with supporting Coalition forces, will be responsible for operations to defeat Al Qaeda and associated movements. The current development program, as implemented by Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), accelerates the hand-over of security responsibility to the ISF, while at the same time continues the training and equipping of MoD forces.

Although significant achievements have been made, the FY 2008 request funds continued investments in equipment, logistics, maintenance, and other areas that are needed if MoD forces are to achieve self-reliance. The MoD requires assistance to continue improvements in ministerial and institutional capabilities. Additionally, the MoD needs an IEDD capability and a “pure fleet” commonality standard among its wheeled and tracked vehicles. The FY 2008 program also initiates a naval maintenance plan to generate and train an organic workforce to maintain the Iraqi Navy’s (IqN) growing fleet. Also, the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) will transition from an initial developmental stage to a capable force. The FY 2008 funding will cement the IqAF rotary and fixed wing capabilities by acquiring single-engine and multi-engine trainers, multi-role fixed wing support aircraft, and courseware to train operator and maintenance crews to sustain previous investments.
**Equipment and Transportation**

**Iraq Ground Forces.** Funds will provide equipment critical to the success and safety of Iraqi ground forces (IGF) by enhancing IEDD capabilities, attaining pure fleet commonality, and providing vital equipment modernization. The insurgents use the IEDs to target Defense forces and the civilian population resulting in diminished mission capacity and gross loss of life. The ISF’s defeat capabilities will be advanced by providing high-tech equipment to predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, and mitigate IEDs. The achievement of pure fleet commonality is unattainable with the large number of systems currently in the combat support service fleet. Funds will purchase common system vehicles reducing the fleet to just one or two systems, thus supporting the pure fleet commonality goal and enabling better logistical support by national maintenance depots. The IGF’s firearms and night-vision equipment requires frequent repair or replacement. The investment to modernize these critical equipment items will increase the IGF’s ability to execute Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and aggressively search out and defeat the insurgency.

**Iraq Air Forces (IqAF) Systems Development.** The IqAF currently relies heavily on coalition involvement to provide air mobility, close air support, and ISR platforms. The IqAF is required to provide a broad range of capabilities that ensure defense and security missions within Iraq’s boundaries are successful. The current aircraft fleet does not fulfill the requirements to support a modern, mobile, land force. The requested funding will continue developmental activities initiated with FY 2007 Supplemental requests. The funding will procure Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fixed-wing aircraft to initially equip the IqAF with an intelligence collections-based platform. It procures training aircraft to develop future IqAF pilots and funds light transports to enhance airlift development capabilities. The funding completes COIN aircraft development and procures precision munitions for the offensive/defensive COIN system. It also continues the development of the GoI’s integrated Air Defense/Air Traffic Control systems.

**Sustainment**

The bulk of the funding in the sustainment sector will be used for logistics development by supporting Taji National Warehouse operations. The GoI has identified the facility at Taji as the National Depot to support the ISF. Funds will sustain on going developmental activities supporting supply management, fuel and warehouse storage capacities, and vehicle maintenance operations at the National Depot.

The funding will also be used to develop a Naval Maintenance Plan. The Naval Maintenance Plan will ensure the current fleet is
sustained while a “train the trainer” program is concurrently employed to develop a maintenance support function within the IqN. This activity will sustain naval investments while fulfilling developmental capabilities which in turn ensure sea ports, economic sea lanes in Iraq littoral waters, and oil platforms remain safe during transition to Iraqi self-reliance.

Training and Operations

The funding will support Ministerial Capacity Development, which is the concentrated effort to develop institutional capabilities at senior managerial levels within the MoD. U.S. Government partners led by MNSTC-I’s Transition Teams specifically focus on building and developing ministerial capabilities in Logistics (maintenance/ supply/ distribution), Personnel, Finance, Contracting, and Medical specialties within the Ministry and subordinate organizational levels. The IqAF is beginning multiple training programs to develop aircraft operators and maintainers. This activity funds the required courseware to begin basic skills development for selected candidates.

Ministry of Interior (MoI)

Under the revised strategy, the Iraqi MoI forces will be trained and equipped like MoD forces. They will have lead responsibility for quelling sectarian violence and will lead in the effort against militia, with Coalition support as required. The United States will create robust DoD advisory teams within MoI forces by embedding U.S. advisors down to the army battalion/police station level. The United States will also press senior Iraqi officials to emphasize national priorities rather than ethno-sectarian allegiance in hiring and command selection.

The FY 2008 request continues development of MoI force capabilities. The request funds enhancements to ministerial capabilities and advisory activities within the MoI. The request also assists the MoI in modernizing critical equipment and initiates a “pure fleet” commonality standard for police vehicles. These initiatives are designed to enhance the Objective Civil Security Forces (OCSF) as they perform civil security and rule of law missions. Further, additional investments in general office automation equipment will assist five MoI agencies housing OCSF personnel, support forces, and police recruits. Finally, funds will finance OCSF advisors and trainers through the Department of State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program.

Equipment and Transportation

Funds will provide equipment critical to the success and safety of the OCSF by attaining pure fleet commonality and providing vital equipment modernization. Current provincial maintenance operations are unable to adequately maintain vehicle fleets due to the large number of different systems it must support. This creates significant logistical challenges for provincial maintenance operations due to the number of brands of parts it must stock and the lack of mechanics skilled in multiple systems. Funds will be used to purchase common system vehicles, reducing the fleet to just one or two systems, thus supporting the pure fleet commonality goal and enabling increased logistical support by provincial maintenance facilities. The modernization of critical equipment items will increase the ability to execute OCSF operations, and root out and defeat the insurgency.

The funding also supports a General Office Automation initiative, which will procure computer workstations, printers, software, and ancillary devices for MoI facilities housing the OCSF personnel, and police recruits enrolled at MoI training facilities.
**FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request**

**Training and Operations**

The bulk of the training funding will support the Department of State’s INL training efforts. The INL advises USG agencies on developing policies and programs to combat international crime and narcotics. The INL support is provided to MoI Forces through MNSTC-I by one of two programs, International Police Trainers (IPT) or International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO). The IPTs are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to conduct training at police academies throughout Iraq. The IPLOs are experienced civilian law enforcement officers employed to organize, train, coach, and support Iraqi civil security forces.

The funding will also support Ministerial Capacity Development, which is the concentrated effort to develop institutional capabilities at senior managerial levels within the MoI. The U.S. Government partners led by MNSTC-I’s Transition Teams (TTs) specifically focus on building and developing ministerial capabilities in Logistics (maintenance/supply/distribution), Personnel, Finance, Contracting, and Medical specialties within the Ministry and subordinate organizational levels. Outputs include standard policies, formulated strategic plans, and managerial practices and procedures to assist in the Ministry’s management processes.

**SUMMARY**

There have been significant achievements in the establishment of the Iraqi Security Forces. Any disruption of progress at this crucial juncture would prolong Iraqi Security Forces reliance on Coalition forces and hamper its ability to assume responsibility for securing Iraq and maintaining internal peace and stability. Continued investments are required to enhance command and control, infrastructure, maintenance, training and logistics in order to capitalize on previous achievements and sustain fielded units. Additionally, investments are necessary in the Iraqi Air Force to complement and support the Army, Navy, and Police forces in Counterinsurgency operations as well as patrolling Iraq’s borders and littorals. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are currently undergoing intensive transition training in a myriad of administrative functions necessary to run a modern government.

Ultimately, the success of Iraqi democracy and professional security forces relies on the success of the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces. The FY 2008 GWOT request is necessary to ensure that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior can assume operational and strategic control from the Coalition. Success in this mission will reduce the responsibility of U.S. and Coalition Forces to provide security in Iraq.

**Iraq**

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**Totals as of January 2007** 328,500

Additional details provided under separate cover
Numbers may not add due to rounding
Iraq Security Force Lead

October 2005

November 2006

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of 30 Oct 2005 and MNC-I, C3 as of 27 Nov 2006
Afghan Security Forces

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support the security forces of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan until it can provide for its own security.

Funding: $2.7B
• Continue building the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
• Develop a Counter Narcotic Police capability
DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $2.7 billion to support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for FY 2008. At $2.7 billion, the total funding level for the ANSF for FY 2008 builds on the FY 2007 funding and effectively completes the equipping and facilities construction stages of their development, with the goal of reducing ANSF dependence on Coalition forces. After FY 2008, the vast majority of requirement funding will be for training and sustaining the enhanced ANSF, built largely with the FY 2007 and FY 2008 GWOT funding.

When the United States and its Coalition partners began Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, there were two missions:

- Defeat Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies in Afghanistan;
- Create a stable, moderate Afghan democracy that will never again provide sanctuary for terrorists.

It is hard to comprehend the destitution present in Afghanistan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. A lawless region that provided a training ground and sanctuary for Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network, Afghanistan had suffered from decades of violence that resulted in millions of casualties and billions of dollars in economic damage. The progress made in Afghanistan since that time is significant.

Five years later, Afghanistan is no longer a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime is no longer in power. While
Afghanistan remains a central front in the Global War on Terror, on October 5, 2006, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by NATO, took the lead for international forces in the country. The ISAF now accounts for more than two-thirds of the international forces operating in Afghanistan, tasked with assisting the Government of Afghanistan in providing stability and security, extending governance, and defeating the remnants of the former Taliban regime and other spoilers that are attempting to derail progress.

The Afghan National Security Forces are steadily growing in strength and capability. By mid-January 2007, there were 31,300 Afghan National Army soldiers and 59,700 Afghan National Police trained and equipped. Enabling these forces to provide for the security of their own nation is central to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Despite the progress made to date, much remains to be done. This past year’s increase in violence and narcotics production represents a shift in the strategic environment. Taliban presence and strength has grown in some areas of the country, especially the south, and the relatively weak institutions of the GoA enable insurgents to operate in the absence of government presence.

As a result, the Department has requested additional funding in 2007 in order to accelerate and increase our efforts to meet the objectives for Afghanistan. The Administration has also identified areas where efforts could be increased, expanded, and/or better coordinated to achieve the desired effects of extending governance, increasing prosperity and providing security. The FY 2008 GWOT request will enable the Department to complete the training and equipping of the ANSF with the more independent capabilities. This is a fundamental step in securing Afghanistan and preventing it from, again becoming to a haven for extremists.

Afghan National Army

Building on FY 2007’s revised program, the FY 2008 funding for the Afghan National Army (ANA) sustains the expanded ANA with the capacity and capabilities that will allow the ANA to assume the lead for counterinsurgency and internal operations. Because of the change in the security environment, with a resurgent Taliban and a more capable ANA, the pre-2007 plan for the ANA would have created a basic infantry force that could not have conducted counterinsurgency missions without help from international forces. The FY 2007 request provided additional equipment and capabilities to the ANA. The FY 2008 request supports the larger, more comprehensive force.

The program builds on the current success of the ANA. These soldiers have fought bravely side-by-side with the international forces and won the respect of the Afghan people, despite less reliable weapons and weaker force protection.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

This funding request will continue to equip the Afghan soldiers with more reliable and capable weapons, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and armored vehicles, and advanced first aid kits to ensure care for those who are injured.

The full 70,000 person force of 14 brigades will include better capabilities like a small, but capable air corps that will take the Army to the fight and provide for rapid evacuation of casualties. Six trained battalions with specialized capabilities including rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on the counterinsurgency mission, are now part of the Afghanistan planned force. The Army will now include combat support units, including engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police. The FY 2008 request includes funds to sustain these units.

Afghan National Police

The departments of Defense and State plan to train and equip a force that will include specialized units to address some of Afghanistan’s key issues. The Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A) program will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving Afghanistan’s interdiction capabilities. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment to improve its ability to perform its mission to secure the country’s frontiers and enforce, among other things, customs regulations.

Additionally, a new unit will be established to fill a gap in ANP capability. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) will be a specialized unit, with tactical gear, improved force protection, and specialized equipment, to be the rapid response force for civil emergencies like the May 2006 Kabul riots.

The revised program recognized that a more robust police force is required to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by maintaining security throughout Afghanistan, particularly in areas from which the ANA and international forces have cleared Taliban fighters following combat. The original Afghan National Police (ANP) program focused on a more narrow law enforcement mission, leaving the ANP less capable to address the security environment complicated by Taliban, narco-traffickers, and other illegal elements.

The ANP received additional attention and resources under the FY 2007 Supplemental Request, including an increase in end strength from 62,000 to 82,000 force. In comparison with the ANA, the ANP had lagged in progress, due in part to institutional corruption, low literacy rates among recruits, and a history of low pay. The FY 2008 request completes the equipping and training of the ANP, dedicating an approximate 30 percent share of the funding requested.
The Way Ahead

The United States cannot achieve nor sustain these ANSF objectives alone. The Government of Afghanistan has committed to providing the manpower to meet these objectives. Equally as important, Afghan leadership has committed to make the necessary security sector reforms that will ensure that the ANSF are responsible and lasting institutions. Through ventures like the Border Management Initiative, the United States is helping the Government of Afghanistan to increase revenues, which will provide a source of income to support and sustain the forces.

The international community also has a role in building the ANSF. Millions of dollars have been donated for equipment by countries for both the ANA and the ANP. Germany has played a key part with its police training program, and ISAF countries contribute Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams that embed with trained ANA units to provide in-the-field mentoring. NATO is also exploring near- and long-term ways that it can assist with equipping and training.

For the security sector in particular, the United States recognizes that more needs to be done in response to the resurgent Taliban. Both the United States and international forces this summer faced the enemy in larger-scale operations and more intense fighting. The combat phases of the “Mountain” series of operations and ISAF’s Operation Medusa focused on denying the enemy safe havens, interdicting its movement, and targeting its routes. The ANSF played an increasingly important role as these operations progressed.

The combat phases of these operations, however, were only the precursors to efforts focused on extending the authority of the Government of Afghanistan and strengthening the rule of law, reconstruction programs, humanitarian assistance, and economic development.

The shift in the strategic environment also highlighted the need to revise and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. In order to enable the ANSF to respond to the resurgent Taliban, the United States needs to continue to accelerate the pace of the ANSF train and equip program for the expanded force and to provide enhanced capabilities. The desired end state for the ANSF remains a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable ANSF, but the force being built must be less reliant on international assistance and more capable of taking the fight to the Taliban.

FUNDING REQUEST

The FY 2008 GWOT request supports the expanded ANSF with its independent capabilities to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements. After thoroughly analyzing the ANSF program from January through April 2006, the Commanding General for the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan determined that the existing program failed to develop an ANSF of sufficient capability or capacity to address the increased insurgent threats facing Afghanistan. The ANSF produced by the pre-FY 2007 program would have remained tethered to Coalition Forces for basic combat enablers (highly-trained and equipped counter-insurgent forces, Close Air Support, Casualty Evacuation, Transport Aviation, Military Intelligence, Logistics, etc.) for the long term. This FY 2008 funding request is structured to complete the FY 2007 Supplemental requested program and meet the following goals:

- Develop the capabilities necessary for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations with limited Coalition support;
- Establish the rule of law throughout Afghanistan, thereby helping set the conditions for the successful completion of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Afghan National Army

The FY 2008 request is smaller than the FY 2007 request but completes the training and equipping of the ANSF with the expanded capabilities of more independent operations. It also provides for the sustainment of these forces.

- **Infrastructure:** These funds will be used for garrisons and other required facilities;

- **Equipment and Transportation:** These funds will be used primarily to provide the ANA with logistical equipment, consisting mostly of vehicles, including Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs); and with tactical equipment such as military intelligence equipment for field use at Corps Military Intelligence Company level, and offensive and defensive surveillance equipment. The request will also supply the Corps Combat Teams and engineering brigades with Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) required capability and communication equipment to support the expanded number of units funded by the ASFF resources;

- **Training:** In order to implement the expanded capabilities and capacity of the Afghan National Army, training has been expanded to provide for various combat support specialties, such as Engineer Battalion level training. The FY 2008 request will fund Communications training such as encryption, network security, and other telecommunications training. It will also fund medical and intelligence training courses;

- **Sustainment:** As the capacity of the Afghan National Army increased with the FY 2007 Supplemental Request that targeted the recognized requirements of a more independent and organically supported force, sustainment costs also rose due to the increased number of troops and the requirements related to the larger number of specialties.

Afghan National Police

The ANP Program is the police part of the ANSF. The ANP is a planned 82,000 police force comprised of Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (formerly the Afghan Standby Police), and Counternarcotics Police. The program would equip, train, and sustain a respected, effective, affordable, multi-ethnic, and professional force that maintains the rule of law. The program enables the Government of Afghanistan to build the capability to maintain domestic order, protect the rights of Afghan citizens, deny any safe havens for terrorists, police Afghanistan’s borders, and safeguard critical infrastructure. This mandate includes facilitating a well-led, motivated force capable of performing its assigned law and order missions. This force will be self-sustaining, able to attract qualified candidates, and require minimal international assistance.

**ANP Requirements:**

- **Infrastructure:** These funds will be used for ANP Infrastructure requirements planned for FY 2008. Facilities maintenance and repair costs are identified under sustainment;

- **Equipment and Transportation:** These funds will be used primarily to complete the equipment requirements that were begun in the FY 2007 funding request that increased the police capacity and capabilities;

- **Training:** These funds will provide training dollars to conduct basic and specialized training, including basic policing, tactical training, counterterrorism training, criminal investigation, SWAT training, and ANCOP training. Much of these training funds will go to the Department of State with their International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Affairs Bureau providing the training. Medical training is also planned to expand the capabilities of the ANP;
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

- **Sustainment**: These funds will be used for base salaries and benefits; vehicles; weapons and communication equipment maintenance; repair, parts and replacement for all equipment; facilities maintenance and operations; and other miscellaneous expenses such as fuel, food, and office supplies.

**Detainee Operations**

Detainee operations mentors, organizes, trains, and equips a self-sustaining detainee program within the MoD for the detention of Afghan enemy combatants. The FY 2008 funds will be spent on sustainment and training.

**SUMMARY**

Without U.S. funding, the Government of Afghanistan will be incapable of countering the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia, Taliban, Al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narco-terrorists, and any other anti-government elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has neither the budget, experienced Army or Police force, nor the infrastructure to equip, build and sustain a reliable, effective police force.

![Afghanistan table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Security Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining Institutions</td>
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<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
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<td>ANA Combat Forces</td>
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<td>Afghan Air Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID, Customs, Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals as of January 2007**

91,000

*Additional details provided under separate cover
Numbers may not add due to rounding*
Map of Afghan Controlled Territory

As of December 2006

ANSF Lead with CF Support
- “ANSF Lead with CF Support” refers to ANSF elements that have the ability to “Lead with Coalition Support” (ANA) and “Capable with Mentor Support” (ANP) for a period of at least 30 days.

ANP Only Lead
- “ANP Only Lead” refers to areas with ANP responsibility.
Coalition Support

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the United States to support coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism.

Funding: $1.7B
• Supports Pakistan, Jordan and other key cooperating nations
• Funds airlift and support and military capacity building for partner nations
The Department of Defense requests $1.7 billion to continue support to U.S. coalition partners for FY 2008, an 11% decrease from the FY 2007 level.

This will enable the Department of Defense to leverage the support of U.S. coalition partners by reimbursing them for expenses incurred in supporting U.S. military operations (Coalition Support Funds) and providing logistical support (Lift and Sustain) to countries that are participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and globally. These programs enable Coalition partners to participate in U.S. operations when they would otherwise lack the financial means to do so. Coalition support helps to reduce the stress on U.S. forces operating in the global war on terror.

The funding request for FY 2008 will:

- Ensure Pakistan, Jordan, and key cooperating nations are reimbursed for support to U.S. operations;
- Provide funding to pay for lift and sustain support to Coalition partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other U.S. military operations globally.

Previous funding has supported Pakistan’s major border operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which have significantly affected terrorist networks in the region, achieving a level of success that would be difficult for U.S. Armed Forces to attain, and leading to a more stable border area. In the same way, Jordan has provided key support along the Jordan-Iraq border, resulting in greater force protection for U.S. forces operating in Iraq.

Lift and sustain funding allowed Poland to lead the Multinational Division Center South by providing the airlift for Coalition partners and sustainment support for coalition countries during deployments. “Global Lift and Sustain,” a new authority granted in the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.

**FUNDING REQUEST**

**Coalition Support**

Continued support from Congress for Coalition Support Funds is critical to maintaining the viability of the Coalition and supporting countries who wish to make a contribution to the war on terror but do not have the economic means to finance their participation.

Specific examples of the results of DoD Coalition Support include:

---

**Coalition Support**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<th>FY 2007 Total</th>
<th>FY 2008 Total</th>
<th>Percent Change FY 2007</th>
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<td>Global Train and Equip</td>
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<td>-100%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Coalition Support</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-11%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

- **Pakistan**
  - Since October 2001, the United States has reimbursed Pakistan approximately $4.5 billion for operations that Pakistan conducted along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in support of Operation Enduring Freedom;
  - Beginning in early 2006, Pakistan expects to commit $150 million a year of its own resources to improve education, road building, basic health, and water projects in the region;
  - Pakistan’s military support has significantly damaged terrorist networks in the region – achieving successes that would be difficult for U.S. armed forces to attain;
  - Since December 2001, Pakistan has conducted almost 100 major operations including 8 joint operations with coalition forces;
  - Although taking considerable casualties itself, Pakistan has apprehended and killed many militants;
  - Pakistan has established check points and is deploying quick reaction forces in the region to support war on terror objectives.

- **Jordan**
  - Since October 2001, the U.S. has reimbursed Jordan almost $290 million for operations Jordan is conducting in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom;
  - Despite its limited economic means, Jordan has conducted border operations along the Jordan-Iraq border. These operations are having a major impact in curbing undesirables transiting across the border;
  - Jordan has also operated two field hospitals, in Iraq and
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Afghanistan, providing medical treatment to thousands of injured coalition forces and civilians, which have served to free up U.S. and other coalition medical resources to support needs elsewhere.

- Key Coalition Partners
  - Multinational Division-Center South: The United States has reimbursed Poland and other participating countries approximately $363 million for expenses incurred in taking the lead of, and participating in, the Multinational Division-Center South in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These expenses include airlift provided by Ukraine and others, telecommunications charges, LOGCAP support prior to FY 2005, and other base operations support typically associated with running a Division. Coalition Support Funds allowed Poland to take over the Division with the assurance that logistical support for the Coalition partners serving in the Division would be provided and would be on the same level as that provided to Coalition partners serving under U.S. command;
  - Georgia: The United States has reimbursed Georgia $53 million to finance pre-deployment training to ensure Georgia’s troops would be able to conduct the security mission in Operation Iraqi Freedom in a capable and expert manner. Georgia’s troops are committed to Iraq through September 2008 and have served as a significant force multiplier;
  - Mongolia: The United States has reimbursed Mongolia approximately $6 million for pre-deployment preparations for its seven rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. These reimbursements resulted in adequately trained Mongolian troops who were able to support the security mission in Iraq;
  - Other partners including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Ukraine, and Lithuania – have received reimbursements with Coalition Support Funds. These countries have been able to support the Coalition and reduce requirements for U.S. soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Lift and Sustain

Lift and Sustain funds enable the Department to provide airlift and other logistical support at no cost to coalition partners who are participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since FY 2005, the Department of Defense has provided approximately $800 million in logistical support to coalition partners with a lesser capacity to pay:

- Approximately $700 million has been expended for sustainment-type support for coalition partners, including the LOGCAP contract for Poland’s Multinational Division—Center South;
- Approximately $100 million in airlift has been provided to allow coalition partners without an airlift capability to deploy and redeploy to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Continued support from Congress in appropriating Lift and Sustain funds is essential to ensure coalition partners have the ability to deploy, to redeploy, and to be sustained while serving as members of the coalition. The result is a coalition that contributes directly to war on terror objectives, serves as a force multiplier, and allows U.S. forces to focus their efforts elsewhere and to meet U.S. objectives more effectively.
SUMMARY

Coalition Support Funds are critical. They enable Coalition partners to support U.S. military operations. Without this program, the U.S. will not be able to reimburse Pakistan and Jordan for critical border operations. This could discourage participation and require the U.S. military to take on operations better covered by Coalition partners. In the case of Pakistan and Jordan border operations, the U.S. would likely not be able to conduct these operations as capably as the indigenous forces can.

Without Lift and Sustain funding, many Coalition countries would not be able to maintain their forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such a result would adversely affect U.S. operations by placing an additional burden on U.S. forces. Without support in Afghanistan, NATO members with limited economies, such as Poland and Romania, may not be able to participate thus hindering the ability of NATO and the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan.

Without funding for Global Lift and Sustain, the United States would not be able to benefit from the assistance of partners who are willing to make valuable contributions to in combined operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, but are unable to finance their own deployment expenses.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to provide ground commanders with a source of funds to assist local populations with urgently needed humanitarian relief and reconstruction.

Funding: $1.0B
• Funds a variety of critical, small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects as identified by commanders in the field, such as:
  – Power lines and generators
  – Health care centers
  – Civic and cultural facilities
  – Condolence payments
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
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DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $1.0 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for all of FY 2008.

The CERP supports Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by providing ground commanders a source of funds to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the local population. The CERP supports the GWOT by helping to win trust and improve civil infrastructures in Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides U.S. appropriated funds directly to operational and tactical forces, enabling them to meet emergency needs. What distinguishes CERP is that commanders spend funds based on local information. The CERP projects are the grassroots effort by local commanders to deal quickly with short-term needs. Projects are conducted in concert with large-city and nationwide projects headed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

FUNDING REQUEST

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program enables commanders to respond quickly to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by executing programs that will immediately assist the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. Funds are used for projects related to water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture; electricity production/distribution; healthcare; education; telecommunication; transportation; irrigation; civic cleanup; repair of civic/cultural facilities; economic, financial and management improvements; efforts to improve rule of law and governance; condolence payments, or repairs for...
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

losses incurred as a result of U.S., coalition or supporting military operations; protective measures to ensure the viability and survivability of critical infrastructure sites; and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects.

The FY 2008 funding request of $1.0 billion equals the amount of FY 2007 requested CERP funding. Insurgent activities and ongoing sectarian violence have continued to cause instability and a severe infrastructure, safety, health, education, and economic development crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan. The requested CERP funds will assist in alleviating the hardships inflicted on the civilian population of Iraq and Afghanistan by the ongoing violence.

The CERP is designed to enable local commanders Iraq and Afghanistan to quickly respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of responsibility. As such, CERP is an extremely dynamic and robust program that is critical to the ultimate success of the OIF/OEF campaigns and the transfer of responsibility to the newly established Iraqi and Afghani governments. The CERP has been instrumental in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Afghani people, and the requested FY 2008 funding is required to support the ground commander’s ability to respond to local humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.

SUMMARY

Without the requested funds, commanders in the field will be unable to adequately respond to immediate needs of the Iraqi and Afghan people. The inability to fund urgent reconstruction and humanitarian relief projects would constitute a major hurdle in building trust with the Iraqi and Afghan people.

In effect, it would deprive U.S. Commanders of a critical and relatively inexpensive tool that has demonstrated its value repeatedly in the GWOT.

CERP Categories

Types Of Payments/Projects Funded by CERP During the Past 24 Months

Water/Sanitation – Repair or reconstruction of water treatment plants, sanitation facilities, pump stations, pipelines, wells, and sewers

Education – School repair/furnishings; education supplies, student backpacks, and sport areas

Electricity – Repair or reconstruction of electricity stations, power lines, generators, and street lights

Food Production – Humanitarian food deliveries, livestock, animal feed, slaughterhouse repair, and fish farms

Healthcare – Hospital and health care center repair, medical equipment, wheelchairs, and ambulances

Irrigation – Irrigation stations and canals

Protective Measures – Private security at reconstruction projects, oil refinery and pipeline facilities

Civic/Cultural Repair – Repair to mosques, museums, libraries, cultural centers, city halls, and fire stations

Telecommunications – Repair or reconstruction of telecommunication systems infrastructure.

Transportation – Road repair, paving, highway guard rails and lights

Condolence Payments – Payment to individual civilians for death, injury or property damage.
Military Construction

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to employ limited construction projects to support wartime operations and enhance force protection.

Funding: $0.7B
• Operational facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Roads and bridges
• Basic infrastructure
• Force protection enhancement
• Support Facilities
• Landfills
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

### Military Construction

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Facilities</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>Roads and Bridges</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>—</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Facilities</td>
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<td>-50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landfills</td>
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<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-36%</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

### DESCRIPTION

The Department of Defense requests $0.7 billion for critical military construction projects in FY 2008. These projects are essential to the success of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Military Construction is a key enabler in the GWOT, directly supporting wartime operations and enhancing force protection.

### FUNDING REQUEST

The request supports various military construction projects that fulfill Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom theater infrastructure requirements.

The requested funds will provide force protection measures, airfield facilities, operational facilities, support facilities, billeting, fuel handling and storage, utility systems, and roads in Iraq and Afghanistan in accordance with U.S. Central Command priorities.

**Operational Facilities**

The request would fund a Rotary Wing Heavy Aircraft Parking Apron at Camp Speicher, Iraq. The base routinely has multiple heavy aircraft off-loading cargo and passengers at the same time. The parking aprons are not sized to park heavy commercial and military aircraft, which are forced to park on unlighted active taxiways. The situation forces heavy cargo equipment to operate extremely close to the aircraft, personnel on foot, and the passenger terminal, which is adjacent to the cargo yard. This creates a critical safety hazard that will become worse as more missions consolidate on base. If this project is not provided, the lack of apron space will continue to create serious safety hazards, mixing passengers, aircraft, and cargo equipment in dangerously close proximities.

An Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) is also required at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. This project will build 12 munitions storage igloos that will support both Army and Air Force requirements on the base. These igloos will increase the size and amount of munitions that can be stored at Bagram. Without this project, Air Force will not be able to store the larger munitions for their bombers, which would limit the amount of these munitions that can be stored. This project will allow the storage of these types of munitions that increase the Air Force’s ability to project more air power from Bagram.
This request will also construct storage tanks to meet Petroleum Oil and Lubricant (POL) mission and storage requirements at Camp Adder, Iraq. Currently, fuel operations are often interrupted due to significant amounts of maintenance on the existing fuel bladders. Without this project, fuel will continue to be stored in deteriorated temporary storage bags, making fuel transfer more cumbersome and time consuming.

**Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Roads**

The request includes four projects in Iraq to construct urban by-pass roads in Mosul, Tikrit, Anaconda, and Al Asad. The roads will allow U.S. and coalition forces to by-pass urban areas, where 95 percent of IED attacks occur. The projects will construct portions of existing road. The existing roads, which are highly traveled by U.S. and Coalition forces, are unpaved and in poor condition. This requires traffic to drive more slowly, exposing U.S. and coalition forces to small arms fire from static positions and increasing the amount of time U.S. and coalition forces spend on the roads. Frequency of mortar attacks continues to rise. Paving these sections of road will enhance force protection measures and safety for U.S. and Coalition forces.

**Basic Infrastructure**

The request will construct power plants at Camps Adder, Speicher, Al Asad, Anaconda, and Q-West in Iraq and at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan. Currently, the camps in Iraq have no primary electrical power distribution infrastructure of sufficient capacity within reasonable proximity to areas in which existing and planned facilities may source their electrical power. The camps use diesel generator sets to provide power, which is expensive. Due to greater pollution discharge, continued reliance on individual diesel engine generator sets will result in the further degradation of air quality in and around the bases. The project at Bagram will replace a smaller leased power plant with a larger power plant and distribution system. Afghanistan
does not have a commercial power grid. A continuous, reliable power plant is needed to meet the current and future operational requirements of Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. The power plant will significantly improve power reliability and stability to this critical forward operating site. In addition, the power plant will dramatically reduce the expenses currently incurred with the smaller leased power plant.

Also requested are funds for waste water treatment and collection systems at Camps Adder, Victory, and Speicher in Iraq. The projects will construct waste water treatment plants and sewage collection systems. The camps currently truck sewage off base because there are no sewage systems. Most of the buildings have separate sewer tanks that must be pumped out, and the product taken off base for disposal. The trucking process is extremely expensive and time consuming. The trucks must be inspected and searched prior to entering and leaving the base, which poses a great force protection risk. The constant transfer process from tanks to trucks results in frequent leaks that leaves waste water spilled on the ground. This sewage removal process creates traffic congestion, resulting in disruption of operations.

**Force Protection**

The request will construct Entry Control Points (ECPs) at Camps Adder, Victory, and Scania in Iraq. The ECPs will include a processing facility and site work to provide a search area for vehicles entering the bases. The existing ECPs are not sufficient, causing current security operations to require a significant amount of time to process military vehicles entering the compound. Vehicle screening is not accomplished until after vehicles have passed the initial entry control points, putting military personnel at increased risk to vehicle-borne IEDs and small arms fire. If not provided, the stationary personnel and vehicles will continue to be at great risk due to significant delays at the entry points.

Also included in the request are facility overhead cover systems for selected high-density gathering facilities at various locations in Iraq. Specific facilities (dining halls, gyms, PX, meeting places) are prioritized based upon threat and vulnerability assessments. The likelihood of attack on a high-density gathering facility has increased. There is mounting evidence that anti-Iraqi forces are specifically targeting these facilities. Failure to provide overhead cover greatly increases the risk of mass casualties from indirect fire attacks.

**Support Facilities**

The request includes construction of a new Level 3 Medical Clinic at Camp Victory, Iraq. The current mobile units are located in tents that are not suitable as long-term medical facilities. Tents will begin to deteriorate within the year and will have to be replaced. Air distribution ductwork is beginning to deteriorate as well. These conditions are conducive to mildew growth that could result in respiratory illness leading to a decline in medical care. Existing facilities are not protected against explosive shrapnel. As they are located in close proximity to the camp’s perimeter, they are susceptible to periodic rocket and mortar attacks. This force protection construction is essential to saving soldiers’ lives.

Another project will construct storage warehouses to support logistical operations at Camp Adder, Iraq. The warehouses will include a controlled humidity system to improve materials storage life. Without these warehouses, supplies will be stored in the open and subjected to environmental degradation, which will delay support to deploying units and stress the supply system.

Also, at various locations in Iraq, requested projects will replace initial expeditionary facilities with new construction. Currently, this requirement is being met by temporary facilities that were constructed during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, these facilities are starting to age and deteriorate to
the point where they require constant repair to remain functional. The existing facilities were designed and constructed with expediency in mind and were only intended for a few years of use. Without replacement, the bases will continue to rely upon the older structures and experience shortfalls in the number and size of facilities needed.

**Landfills**

Landfills are required at nine camps in Iraq. The requested projects will construct landfills for the safe disposal of incinerator ash and other solid waste generated at the bases. The daily ash from incinerators continues to accumulate without a legitimate means of disposal. All excess solid waste is currently placed in nonstandard landfills or is being burned in large open pits. If landfills are not provided, camp personnel will continue to be exposed to hazardous smoke.

**SUMMARY**

If the requested Military Construction funding is not approved, U.S. troops and Coalition forces will be required to conduct wartime operations without these badly needed facilities. As a result, they will be exposed to unnecessary operational danger. Troop health and quality of life will also be affected by deteriorating medical and storage facilities, pollution from power generators, inadequate sewage disposal, and a lack of appropriate landfills for disposal of solid waste.
Reconstitution

HIGHLIGHTS

Policy
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure force readiness by rapidly repairing or replacing equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out in GWOT operations and by providing critical equipment and technology for future deploying forces.

Funding: $37.6B
- Equipment replacements
- Repair of tanks, vehicles, aircraft and communication systems
- Replenishment of munitions
- Replacement of combat losses, including wear-and-tear
- Replenishment of equipment; and
- Repair and/or upgrade of equipment

Total Annual Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Previously Appropriated</th>
<th>FY07 Supplemental Request</th>
<th>FY08 GWOT Request</th>
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<td>23.6</td>
<td>$37.6B</td>
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<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
The Department of Defense requests $37.6 billion for reconstituting the force for FY 2008 a <1% increase from FY 2007.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed increasing demands on equipment that is far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These demands on equipment result in higher maintenance, repair and replacement.

Reconstitution includes the following:
- Replacement of combat losses, including wear-and-tear;
- Replenishment of equipment; and
- Repair and/or upgrade of equipment.

Reconstitution funding also provides for the replacement of helicopters that were either destroyed as a result of hostile action or are stressed beyond repair. These include:
- 29 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH), which provide tactical overhead reconnaissance in support of ground forces;
- 39 UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopters, which are used extensively in Iraq to move troops and equipment; and
- 21 CH-47 Chinook helicopters that are critical for high altitude missions in Afghan mountains;
- 12 AH-64 attack helicopter modification kits.

### FY 2008 Aircraft Replacements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
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<td>Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60 Utility Helicopter (BLACKHAWK)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-47 Chinook Helicopter</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/A-18E/F</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-130J Airlift Aircraft</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV-22 OSPREY</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>MV-22 Osprey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1Y/AH-12 Helicopter</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH-60 S/R</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>KC-130J</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The request also includes funding for one F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) to replace an F-16 fighter that was lost during combat operations.

Five CV-22 Vertical Lift Aircraft would be procured to replace MH-53 helicopters lost in combat operations since 9/11. The CV-22 conducts long-range, adverse weather, clandestine penetration for medium-to-high threat environments by Special Operation Forces (SOF). The CV-22 is being procured as a replacement for the MH-53 because the MH-53s are no longer in production. Also being requested are two MV-22 Osprey aircrafts for the Marine Corps, to replace a CH-53E and a CH-47 lost during combat operations.

This request includes funding for 17 C-130Js to replace aircraft that are stressed beyond repair. Also included are up-armored vehicles, and mission-essential support equipment replacements.

Funds are also requested for aircraft modifications designed to replace or upgrade capabilities required to support GWOT operations. Modifications include:

- F-18 Series modifications to include a 3rd generation Litening Targeting ISR pod;
- H-46 Series modifications to include Blue Force Tracking for CH-46E. This battlefield Command and Control (C2) system will be more effective and reliable than the current system and will be common with the US Army FBCB2 system;
- AH-1W modifications to integrate Blue Force Tracker as part of an upgraded cockpit control system, replacing the cockpit display navigation unit and interface control unit;
- C-130 series modifications include Defensive Electronic Counter Measures/Night Vision Lighting to reduce the risk of combat losses due to heat-seeking and radar-guided threats.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing demands on ground force equipment far beyond what is typically experienced during training or home-station operations. These higher demands increase maintenance requirements for equipment employed in the theater, and they do not end when units and equipment redeploy to home station. The Army’s ability to sustain itself through reconstitution efforts is essential to prosecuting the GWOT and to ensuring that the nation has a ready and reliable military force. Reconstitution is a cost of war and one of several components affecting readiness.

**Replenishment**

Timely replenishment of equipment is critical to ensuring the next deploying units have the equipment needed to achieve the mission.

The request funds critically needed construction and force protection equipment for the Naval expeditionary combat forces. This equipment provides combat support and combat service support forces with sufficient capability and capacity to meet the requirements for major combat operations.

This category provides for replenishment of ammunition and missiles stocks consumed in pre-deployment training of accelerated BCTs and forces in the fight. BCTs are equipped with significantly more weapons and require individual and crew training to reach proficiency prior to deployment. Replenishment includes small and medium caliber mortars, shoulder-launched rockets, aircraft launched rockets and flares, demolition materials, grenades, artillery rounds, propellant charges, simulators and non-lethal munitions. Specific weapons include machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, shoulder-fired rockets, demolitions, and non-lethal weapons and munitions.
This request would also fund major equipment requested for the Seabees:

- Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles to replace current HMMWV lacking adequate armor;
- Bulldozers, scrapers, concrete mixers, graders and loaders, and support equipment such as air compressors, generators, and welders;
- Special-purpose trucks to support containers, panel boards, reverse-osmosis units and other pieces of minor equipment;
- The Riverine Force allows the Navy to conduct and support operations predominantly in the inland waterway, or "brown water" areas of the maritime environment. Major equipment being requested for the Riverine squadrons includes tactical vehicles and small boats. Funds will procure Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs), Multi-Mission Craft, and Command and Control Craft.

The request would fund the following Marine Corps equipment replenishment:

- A passenger and recovery variant of the Assault Amphibious Vehicle to improve an amphibious capability;
- The Improved Target Acquisition System will provide long-range, lethal anti-armor fire to the infantry and tank battalions. Funding supports a deployable, self-contained, and centralized facility which provides improved command and control and situational awareness to enhance the common operational picture for the deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force;
- Expandable Capacity Vehicle variants -- improved versions of the standard HMMWV with a heavier chassis and improved engine that enable the use of removable add-on-armor protection, providing greater tactical flexibility for deploying units;
- G-Boss surveillance systems to provide persistent tracking of objects of interest in the Marine forces' effort to prevent or mitigate hostile actions and evolving threats;
- MRAP vehicles to replace lightly protected trucks.

The GWOT request funds the Navy’s requirement for Tomahawk, AMRAAM, SLAM-ER and Hellfire missiles to replace quantities expended during OIF/OEF. The request replaces unserviceable small arms and weapons that are beyond economic repair and provides a variety of vital small arms and weapons to the various deployed elements of the Navy.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

The request funds the Air Force M2 .50 heavy barrel machine gun. This weapon provides a heavy volume of close, accurate, and continuous fire.

The Air Force requests funds for:

- High altitude, precision airdrop system (JPADS);
- Vehicle Explosive Detection Systems (VEDS) that provide electronic means of conclusively detecting explosives without physically contacting the subject;
- Battlefield Control Station in support of Afghanistan operations to conduct improved wide area air surveillance, aircraft identification, weapons control, and data link management;
- Replacements for combat support vehicles for fire/rescue, WMD emergency response and support vehicles;
- Night vision goggles;
- Robotized mine area clearance support platforms and equipment to clear unexploded ordnance and anti-personnel mines at austere locations.

Repair

Repair activities involve the necessary depot and intermediate level maintenance required to restore equipment returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to pre-deployment conditions.

For the Navy, this request funds aircraft, ships and support equipment. This also includes the cost to overhaul, clean, inspect, and maintain equipment to the required condition at the conclusion of an operation. Major components include:

- Airframe rework;
- Engine rework;
- Aeronautical components;
- Ship operating systems.

The request funds Air Force Depot Purchased Equipment Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). Aircraft continuously deployed in support of OIF/OEF experience extreme operational demands in harsh environments, thus accelerating the need for repairs to maintain operational capability. Funding will support bomber

Repair Depot

T-55 Engine used to power the CH-47 helicopters and an actual battle damaged CH-47 helicopter undergoing repair.

A tank when it enters the repair facility for disassembly and the finished product without the turret.
and fighter weapon systems used in support of operations including the B-1, F-15, F-16 and ground stations for Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). Included is CLS funding that addresses the wear and tear resulting from the flying hours associated with KC-10, C-21, C-37, C-40, U-2 and Global Hawk in support of GWOT contingencies. Increased flying hours have driven increased costs for spares, repairs and replenishment, as well as additional contract Field Team Support at deployed locations.

Air Force operational requirements have increased the demand for depot level repairs, and funding provides fleet-wide refurbishment as a direct result of the Global War on Terror for active duty Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. Funding will support depot maintenance overhauls for multiple aircraft (e.g., A-10, B-52, C-5, C-130, F-16 and KC-135). Additionally, funds will allow for depot maintenance and depot software maintenance for missiles.

The major overhaul effort upgrades equipment to the most current modernized configuration. An example of a major overhaul is the upgrade of M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank to the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) configuration which improves the vehicle’s performance against urban threats such as those encountered in Baghdad.

**War Reserves and Pre-positioned stocks ($0.9 billion)**

Funds are required to replenish pre-positioned stocks of spare parts, including war reserve equipment, that have been released in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

- Defense Working Capital Fund - Army Supply: Funds replenishment of stocks issued to combat units deploying to OIF (Authorized Stockage List, Prescribed Load List, and Unit Basic Load). Funding is requested to replenishes secondary inventory items to include aircraft avionics, missile, and ground combat systems that are lost to enemy action or lost/damaged during shipment to the theater.

**SUMMARY**

Replacing, repairing and maintaining the complex equipment in the U.S. inventory is critical to continuing the fight against global terrorism. Given the harsh conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, maintenance has been central to military readiness.

Without the requested funds, overall U.S. military ability to support deploying units will suffer. Critical military capabilities will be deficient and combat air, mobility, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) support pledged to Combatant Commanders will not meet mission requirements and will not support our ability to train the next deploying forces.
Accelerate Brigade Combat Teams/Establish Regimental Combat Team

**HIGHLIGHTS**

**Policy**
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to improve the capability and effectiveness of U.S. forces for 21st century theaters.

**Funding: $1.6B**
- Funds recruiting and retention, incremental pay and relocation
- Funds OPTEMPO of additional Brigade Combat Teams and Regimental Combat Team
- Military Construction

**Total Annual Cost**

- FY 2006: $0.0B
- FY 2007: 3.6
- FY 2008: $1.6B

Previously Appropriated | FY07 Supplemental Request | FY08 GWOT Request
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

Accelerate 2 Army BCTs
Establish 1 Marine Corps RCT

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total BCT/RCT</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>-56%</td>
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</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding

DESCRIPTION
The Department of Defense requests $1.6 billion for continued support to two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in the Army, and one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in the United States Marine Corps that will be accelerated in FY 2007. The total funding level for BCTs/RCT for FY 2007 is $3.6 billion.

FUNDING REQUEST
The Army has identified the brigades required to fulfill the combatant commander's request for forces for OIF/OEF rotation 08-10. In order to meet the deployment timeline, the Army must accelerate the conversion of two units from legacy structures to the modular BCT structure. The Secretary of Defense has approved the Army's selection of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (3/1AD) at Fort Riley, KS, and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (3/1ID), to be built at Fort Hood, TX, and stationed at Fort Knox, KY, in FY 2009 following its deployment and stability period. The accelerated conversion of these brigades requires funding above the Army's baseline to cover manning, training, facilities and equipment. The Army intends in FY 2007 to standup, train and prepare both brigades for deployment in FY 2007. Each will then deploy in FY 2008 to the Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Adding these brigades to the rotational pool will help the Army improve the active component’s deployment-dwell ratio. Currently, active component units are deployed for one year then home for one year (sometimes less) before returning to the theater. This rapid rotational cycle is not sustainable. The Army believes it is essential to lengthen the dwell time cycle to one year of deployment, followed by two years at home station. These two new brigades will put the Army on the path to achieving this goal, enabling it to delay the redeployment of two brigades that have already been to the theater. These units will thus have more time with their families and a longer period for reconstitution and training – all of which are crucial to retaining the best Soldiers.

The Marine Corps has identified three infantry battalions and their corresponding enablers, for a total of 4,000 additional Marines. The identified battalions are the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 9th Marine regiment. They will be manned and equipped to the levels required to conduct current operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. While first
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

producing an increased additional capability in theater, these three new battalions will eventually contribute to an increased deployment to dwell ratio which will relieve the operational tempo stress on Marines and their families.

Military Personnel

The request includes funding for military personnel costs (e.g., incremental pay and allowances) for the Army and the Marine Corps. These funds are needed for the additional Brigade Combat Teams and the Regimental Combat Team that were accelerated in FY 2007 and deployable in FY 2008.

Operation and Maintenance

The Department requires funding to train and support the additional 6,000 Soldiers and 4,000 Marines manning these new brigade/regimental combat teams. Requested funds will support the incremental OPTEMPO growth, mobile training teams used in unit training, and additional range operations and training support at the identified installations.

Military Construction

The Marine Corps military construction projects support the additional infantry battalions established in support of the Global War on Terror. The low density, high demand capabilities that are consistently requested for Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom employment are also those capabilities that the joint force will need to support future GWOT requirements. For the Marine Corps, these military construction projects will increase critical intelligence, reconnaissance, military police, engineer, helicopter, ground mobility, and infantry capacities.

To accommodate additional personnel and equipment due to the mission increase, the following projects at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton in California are required:

- An addition to the Intelligence Battalion Operations Center;
- An Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Facility;
- Bachelor Enlisted Quarters and Mess Hall;
- Military Police Company Headquarters;
- Armories;
- Regimental and Battalion HQs.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

In addition, a Regimental Combat Team Headquarters is required at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The existing facilities for the RCT are inadequately sized and will not support the additional personnel.

Finally, the request will provide a Maintenance/Operations Complex at Camp Lejuene, North Carolina. The project will provide facility support and infrastructure to the newly established 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9).

• The project provides an Operations Complex to include a Battalion Headquarters Facility, an Armory Facility, a Motor Transport Maintenance Facility, a Communications/Electronics Maintenance Facility, a Supply Facility, and an Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer (ISMT);

• No existing facilities exist at Camp Lejeune to support the stand up of 2/9. Specific requirements necessary to support the new battalion and its assigned equipment include additional maintenance bays, administrative space, separate and secure tool rooms, separate and secure parts rooms, a battery room, a crypto room, and an expansion of the tactical vehicle parking ramp;

• If this project is not funded, there will be no operational facilities to support the new infantry battalion assigned to Camp Lejeune. There will be no facilities to maintain equipment, carry out operational initiatives, command and control of the battalion personnel, and to train the Marines to effectively engage in the Global War on Terror.

SUMMARY

Without the requested funds, Marine Corps will not be able to continue to sustain the accelerated Marine Corps battalions.

The transformation of U.S. forces will thus be delayed, which will reduce their capability and effectiveness. Moreover, without these funds, the Marine Corps will have difficulty meeting the deployment timelines, which will place a greater burden on troops currently in theater.
FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request

THE COST OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the President directed Department of Defense to conduct three major military operations:

- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering Afghanistan and other global counterterrorism operations from the Philippines to Djibouti. OEF began immediately after the September 11 attacks and continues;
- Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and other homeland security missions. ONE was launched in response to the 9/11 attacks and continues; and
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the build up of US troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continues with counterinsurgency and stability operations today.

These operations have been funded largely through supplemental appropriations (Figure 1). Since September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated $455 billion for the conduct of these three operations of which $452 billion has been appropriated in supplementals. Approximately $372 billion of the appropriated funds have been obligated through November 2006, (Figure 2) which is the most recent obligation estimate at the time of printing.

The difference between the appropriated and obligated funds is $83 billion. Of this amount, $27 billion has been obligated for non-DoD classified activities, but is not reflected in DoD financial systems. The remaining $56 billion is for reconstitution and maintenance of equipment and for continuing military operations for the remainder of FY 2007 in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regions of the world under Operation Enduring Freedom.

FLUCTUATIONS IN WAR COSTS

Important war cost drivers are:

- The number of troops deployed or anticipated to deploy;
- The pace of operations;
- The amount of equipment and number of personnel to be transported to the theater of operations, within the theater, and the type and level of various support for troops;

Figure 1. DoD Base Budget and GWOT FY01 to FY08

Dollars in Billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY01</th>
<th>FY02</th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
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<td>$444</td>
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<td>Supplements Enacted</td>
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<td>$17</td>
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<td>$328</td>
<td>$375</td>
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<td>$411</td>
<td>$435</td>
<td>$481.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: FY 2007 base budget is a projection pending action on the continuing resolution.

55-08
The rate at which equipment breaks down or is stressed beyond its projected rate of use and the extent and pace of replacing and upgrading equipment; and, finally

Military basing plans that underlie construction requests.

AVERAGE MONTHLY COSTS

The Department calculates the average monthly cost of the global war on terror using only defense expenditures. These calculations do not include the monthly costs incurred by national intelligence programs or programs of the Department of State, or other agencies.

Moreover, the monthly costs of military operations – fuel, food, water, contract support, tank miles, flying hours, steaming days – tend to be constant. The monthly cost of major procurements to replace lost or stressed equipment tends to be episodic and “pushed” toward the end of the fiscal year when contracts negotiations are completed. This has a skewing effect on monthly obligations and makes them inherently more difficult to predict.

In FY 2006, the average monthly cost of operations and equipment reconstitution for Iraq and Afghanistan reached $8.2 billion, (Figure 3) 21 percent higher than in FY 2005, with about three-quarters dedicated to operational costs and one-quarter to investment.

In FY 2007, the average monthly cost of operations and equipment through November is $1.8 billion higher than the FY 2006 rate. Two-thirds of this difference is due to increased procurement of force protection equipment and the remaining one-third is for increased maintenance, inflation, and higher fuel prices.

Source: Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution Report, November 2006

Numbers may not add due to rounding
Table 1a. Funding by Military Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Millions</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
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<th>Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<th>Percent Change</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Non-DoD Classified</td>
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<td><strong>93,382</strong></td>
<td><strong>163,382</strong></td>
<td><strong>141,665</strong></td>
<td><strong>-13%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Congress added $136M for Operation Noble Eagle in the FY 2006 Title IX appropriation
2. FY 2006 does not include $1.5B in non-GWOT activities
3. The FY 2007 supplemental request includes baseline fuel
4. Congress does not appropriate Supplemental funds by military operation. This estimate by operation is subject to change depending on the needs of commanders in the theater.

Table 1b. FY07 & FY08 Iraq and Afghanistan Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Billions</th>
<th>OIF Cost of Operations</th>
<th>OEF Cost of Operations</th>
<th>Iraq Train &amp; Equip</th>
<th>Afghanistan Train &amp; Equip</th>
<th>Cost of Surge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007 Title IX(^1) (Enacted)</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007 Supplemental (New Request)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008 GWOT Request</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008 Defense Base Budget</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Refers to Title IX of the FY 2007 Defense Appropriation Act
### Table 2. Funding by Functional Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuing the Fight</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>31,830.6</td>
<td>35,327.4</td>
<td>67,158.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>1,626.9</td>
<td>3,731.6</td>
<td>5,358.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED Defeat</td>
<td>1,360.0</td>
<td>1,958.1</td>
<td>3,318.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
<td>245.0</td>
<td>1,254.7</td>
<td>1,499.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq &amp; Afghan Security Funds</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Support</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,200.0</td>
<td>1,200.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>423.0</td>
<td>923.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional War on Terror</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>1,181.0</td>
<td>3,819.0</td>
<td>5,000.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>35,327.4</td>
<td>69,767.4</td>
<td>70,559.4</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconstituting the Force</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution</td>
<td>10,208.6</td>
<td>13,943.5</td>
<td>37,577.3</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enhancing Ground Forces</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces “Plus Up”</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,551.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTs / RCT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,612.1</td>
<td>1,557.2</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow the Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,680.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Non-GWOT</td>
<td>2,975.0</td>
<td>8,760.4</td>
<td>5,920.6</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66,027.3</td>
<td>163,382.2</td>
<td>141,664.9</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Reflects FY 2006 Enacted amounts
2 Does not include $1.5B for Non-GWOT activities

Numbers may not add due to rounding
### Table 3. Funding by Appropriation Title

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title IX</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>6,144.5</td>
<td>10,278.8</td>
<td>16,423.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>29,238.0</td>
<td>29,992.0</td>
<td>59,230.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>6,462.7</td>
<td>13,911.1</td>
<td>20,373.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Freedom Fund /JIEDDO</td>
<td>1,360.0</td>
<td>1,958.1</td>
<td>3,318.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Health Program</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,153.6</td>
<td>1,153.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td>4,915.1</td>
<td>3,200.0</td>
<td>9,748.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Capital Fund</td>
<td>2,516.4</td>
<td>516.7</td>
<td>3,033.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,734.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,052.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>108,787.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified &amp; Non-GWOT</td>
<td>2,765.3</td>
<td>2,975.0</td>
<td>5,740.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,500.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,027.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,527.3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Reflects FY 2006 Enacted amounts
2 Does not include $1.5B for Non-GWOT activities

Numbers may not add due to rounding.
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